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ABSTRACT
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive
compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated
academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize
shareholder value by designing an optimal principal-agent contract. Under the alternative rent extraction
view that we examine, the board does not operate at arm’s length; rather, executives have power to
influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are
paid more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive
compensation might be structured sub-optimally. The presence of rent extraction, we argue, is consistent
both with the processes that produce compensation schemes and with the market forces and constraints
that companies face. Examining the large body of empirical work on executive compensation, we show
that the picture emerging from it is largely compatible with the rent extraction view. Indeed, rent
extraction, and the desire to camouflage it, can better explain many puzzling features of compensation
patterns and practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in U.S.
executive compensation; and that the significant presence of rent extraction should be taken into account
in any examination of the practice and regulation of corporate governance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Executive compensation has for long attracted a great deal of attention
from academics, the media, Congress, and the public at large. In the United
States, total executive pay increased dramatically in the 1990s, as the stock
option programs adopted by companies yielded unprecedented gains for
senior executives during the extended bull market.1 These gains were
accompanied by a parallel rise in academic work on the subject.2 Indeed, it
appears that the rate of growth in such academic work has outpaced even
the growth rate of executive compensation levels. 3
This paper questions the dominant view in the academic work on
executive compensation. It also seeks to put forward a systematic and
comprehensive account of an alternative view of executive compensation,
the “rent extraction” view. This view, we argue, is suggested by a realistic
analysis of the processes that produce executive pay and is consistent with
the substantial body of empirical evidence on executive compensation.
Indeed, the rent extraction view can better explain significant features of the
executive compensation landscape, including ones that have been long
regarded as puzzling.
The dominant view of executive compensation among academics has
for some time been what we call “the optimal contracting view.”4 Under this
The median compensation of S&P 500 CEO’s increased by approximately
150% from 1992 to 1998, and option-based compensation provided the largest share
of the gains. See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990's:
Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, at
Table 1 (2000).
2 Recent surveys of this voluminous literature include Perry and Zenner,
supra note 1; John M. Abowd and David S. Kaplan, Executive Compensation: Six
Questions that Need Answering, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 145 (1999); and Kevin J.
Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Handbook of Labor Economics (Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card eds., 1999). A noteworthy survey from an earlier era is
Michael Jensen and J. Zimmerman, Management Compensation and the Managerial
Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1985).
3 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Handbook of Labor
Economics (Orley Ashenfelter and David Card eds., 1999).
He demonstrates
graphically that the increase in academic papers on the subject of CEO pay
outpaced the increase in total CEO pay during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
4 This is the leading view among financial economists, who have done most
of the scholarship in this area. Indeed, as we see later in the paper, there is a large
body of work in financial economics that seeks to explain all of the features of the
executive compensation landscape within an optimal contracting framework. The
optimal contracting view also forms the basis for an important line of legal
scholarship. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35
VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’
1

1

view, executive compensation practices in large, publicly traded companies
are designed to minimize the agency costs that exist between the senior
executives, the agents, and the shareholders, the principals. The board is
viewed as seeking to maximize shareholder value and the compensation
scheme is designed to serve this objective. Financial economists, both
theorists and empiricists, have largely worked within this model in
attempting to explain the various features observed in executive
compensation programs as well as the cross-sectional variation in
compensation practices among firms.
We seek to contrast this optimal contracting view of executive
compensation with an alternative perspective that we label “the rent
extraction view.” The rent extraction view focuses on the ability of executives
to influence the pay process for their own gain at the expense of the
shareholders. Under this view, boards do not adopt optimal compensation
arrangements, because directors are captured by management, sympathetic
to them, or simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation. As a result,
executives receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for
shareholders, and this excess pay constitutes rent.5 Although this rent
extraction view lies at the heart of much of the public outcry over
compensation levels and practices, it has received little attention and
development in the academic literature.6
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 540-571 (1984); Robert Thomas,
Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive? in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE
AMERICA 276 (M. Bruce Johnson ed. 1978); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate
Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959 (1980).
5 Executives can extract rent in ways other than their executive
compensation schemes. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Christine Jolls,
Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 487 (1999);
Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading through Pretrading
Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1998); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider
Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2000). And it is possible
to define compensation schemes as including benefits that managers obtain in any
way as a result of their position, including benefits from insider trading, taking of
opportunities, and so forth. In this paper, however, our focus is solely on the
benefits that executives get, and the rent they extract, from arrangements that are
formally defined and ordinarily viewed as compensation arrangements.
6 Although many practitioners (see, e.g., GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF
EXCESS (1991)) and media commentators express views which are close to the view
we put forward more systematically in this work, academics commonly hold what
we have called the “optimal contracting” view. See supra note 4 and sources cited
therein.
There is some academic work that is close in spirit to ours. A number of
legal scholars have expressed skepticism about the claim that executive
compensation arrangements are designed to maximize shareholder value. See, e.g.,
Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
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The view that executives can extract rents does not imply that there
are no constraints on their ability to do so. One important force in this
respect is what we call the “outrage constraint.” Directors would be reluctant
to approve, and managers hesitant to propose, pay plans that would seem
outrageous to observers. Such plans would therefore embarrass the directors
and executives or reduce the willingness of shareholders to vote with
management in future control contests. The nature of the constraints on the
process implies that executives would have an interest in camouflaging the
presence of rent extraction and concealing its magnitude. Executives thus
would tend to prefer compensation structures and processes that enable
them to do so. According to the rent extraction view, this desire to
camouflage rent extraction has an important influence on the design of
compensation practices and is a key concept for understanding existing
practices.
Although the rent extraction view is conceptually quite different from
the optimal contracting view, the two are not mutually exclusive, and
common executive compensation practices might reflect a mix of rent
extraction and incentive generation. The rent extraction view does not
suggest that no part of the compensation scheme serves shareholders’
interests. It only argues that rent extraction plays an important role in
compensation arrangements and that, as a result, managers are paid more
than is optimal and are paid in ways that are not necessarily optimal for
shareholders.
Our analysis indicates that, indeed, rent extraction is likely to play a
significant role in U.S. executive compensation and that rent extraction
provides an important explanation for many executive compensation
practices and patterns. As a theoretical matter, we argue that the process of
setting compensation is consistent with the extraction of rents by executives.
As an empirical matter, we argue that the extensive empirical evidence
compiled by proponents of the optimal contracting view is consistent with
Executive Pay, 68 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 59 (1992); Mark J. Lowenstein, Reflections on
Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for Reform, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 201 (1996);
Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J.
CORP. L. 231 (1983); Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of
Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1993); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271
(1999).
And several empirical papers by financial economists have recently
suggested that certain of their findings are consistent with, or indicative of,
“appropriation” or “skimming” by executives. Part IV.E infra discusses such studies
by Bertrand and Mullainathan, Benz, Kucher, and Stutzer, and Yermack. No work,
however, has thus far attempted to put forward a full account of an alternative to
the optimal contracting view -- including both a theoretical framework for such an
alternative view and an examination in light of this view of the empirical literature
on executive compensation -- as we aim to do in this paper.
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the rent extraction view, and that, furthermore, important pieces of this
evidence are better explained by the rent extraction view.
We start by presenting in Part II the theoretical structure of the two
alternative views of executive compensation. We begin by providing an
account of the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, and we
discuss the elements and features that one would expect to find in an optimal
compensation contract. We next offer a critique of the optimal contracting
view. Optimal compensation contracts could result either from effective
arm’s length bargaining between the board and the executives or from
market constraints that induce players to adopt such contracts even in the
absence of arm’s length bargaining. Our critique indicates that neither
phenomenon can be expected to constrain executive compensation
effectively. Rather, because bargaining is in fact not at arm’s length, and
because market forces are not sufficiently strong to require the adoption of
optimal compensation contracts, executives can be expected to secure
contracts that provide them with significant rent.
After analyzing the problems with the optimal contracting view, we
turn to providing an account of the alternative rent extraction view of
executive compensation. The very reasons for questioning the optimal
contracting view also suggest that executives will have substantial influence
over their own pay and thus significant power to extract rents. These
reasons also suggest that the greater managers’ power, the greater their
ability to extract rents.
Two important building blocks in the rent extraction view are the
“outrage constraint” and “camouflage.” Although directors would acquiesce
in management rent extraction to a certain point, they would draw the line at
practices so outrageous as to cause them embarrassment or sully their
reputation, and both directors and management might wish to refrain from
choices that would increase the likelihood of ouster. Because outrage
resulting from outsiders’ recognition of the presence of rent extraction
provides an important constraint on compensation under this model, choices
intended to obfuscate and legitimize – or, more generally, to camouflage –
play a significant role in the design of compensation arrangements. This key
concept of camouflage will turn out to be quite useful in explaining many of
the patterns and puzzles provided by the executive compensation landscape.
We conclude Part II by considering the role of conformity to norms, and how
this phenomenon can play a role under either an optimal contracting view or
a rent extraction view.
We then turn to a detailed examination, in light of the two alternative
views, of the vast empirical literature on executive compensation. Part III
starts this examination by focusing on those main features of the executive
compensation landscape that are consistent with both views. These features
include the increasing use of executive stock options over the past two
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decades, the use of compensation consultants and surveys, and the limited
fraction of incremental corporate value transferred to executives. We show,
for example, that the extensive use of compensation consultants can be seen
as an attempt to optimize incentives under the optimal contracting view or
as a means of justifying and legitimizing pay under the rent extraction view.
Part IV points out a significant number of compensation practices and
patterns which can be better explained by the rent extraction view and thus
suggest the presence of rent extraction. Most of the practices and features
that we analyze in this Part are ones that have long been regarded as puzzles
by researchers working within the optimal contracting view. These puzzles,
we argue, can be better explained by the rent extraction view. We first turn
to firms’ failure to filter out industry or broader market stock price effects by
using some form of indexing or benchmarking. The lack of such filtering
means that executives are rewarded for share price increases even when
those increases are purely a function of economy-wide and sector changes
that are beyond their control. As a result, even poorly performing managers
can make significant profits when option compensation is based on changes
in the absolute share price. The substantial compensation dollars that are
spent on rewarding managers for general market rises could be either used
to enhance incentives (by, for example, giving managers a larger number of
indexed options) or saved.
As we show, the almost complete absence of indexing in option
programs is rather difficult to explain from an optimal contracting
perspective. We explore the range of possible ways to filter out general
market rises and show how unlikely it is that no form of filtering is ever
optimal. We also argue that the accounting considerations that are used to
justify non-indexing are likely to be of little importance in at least some
cases, and in any event could probably be avoided by designing the filtering
scheme in certain ways.
The absence of any filtering of general-market or industry effects is
not puzzling, however, from the rent extraction perspective. On this view,
compensation schemes are often designed with an eye to maximizing
executive pay while staying within the range of legitimacy and acceptability.
Given that the use of regular options is well-established and generally
considered a legitimate form of compensation, and that indexing might serve
shareholders’ interests but reduce managers’ benefits, the lack of any
movement toward some form of indexing is consistent with the rent
extraction view.
Part IV next considers the near-uniform use of at-the-money options.
An optimally designed option scheme would seek to provide risk-averse
managers with the strongest cost-effective incentives to exert effort and make
value-maximizing decisions. The optimal exercise price under such a scheme
should depend on various factors that might differ from executive to
executive, from company to company, and from time to time, including the
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degree of managerial risk aversion (which in turn might be affected by the
manager’s age and wealth), the project choices available to the firm, the
volatility of the company’s stock, the expected rate of inflation, and the
length of the contract. There is thus no reason to expect that the same
exercise price formula would be optimal for all executives at all firms in all
industries at all times. Thus, the fact that options are almost uniformly
issued at-the-money is rather difficult to explain from an optimal contracting
perspective.
However, the uniform use of at-the-money-options is not puzzling
from the rent extraction perspective. From this perspective, given that
executives benefit from lower exercise prices, there will be a desire to push
exercise prices to the lowest level possible without crossing the outrage
constraint. There is no reason for designers of plans to seek to raise the
exercise prices above the market price at the time the options are issued,
given that some justification is available for at-the-money-options. The only
things to avoid is giving in-the-money-options which might be regarded as a
windfall and whose grant might undermine the accounting justification for
avoiding indexed compensation schemes.
Another puzzle for optimal contracting is managers’ widespread
freedom to unwind their incentives. An optimal principal-agent contract
can be expected to place some constraints on managers’ ability to sell stock
or hedge the stock options given to them in order to better align their
interests with those of shareholders. However, aside from vesting
requirements such restrictions are almost never imposed. Thus, executives
usually sell existing shares when granted options or restricted stock, exercise
options well before expiration, immediately sell the shares they acquire upon
exercise of options, and seek to hedge their exposure when disposal is not
possible.
The lack of such restrictions, while difficult to explain from an optimal
contracting perspective, is consistent with rent extraction. Under this view,
compensation plans are designed with managers’ welfare in mind. The rent
extraction view thus predicts that designers of compensation plans would
avoid adding restrictions on unwinding, which might well serve
shareholders but which would reduce managers’ benefits.
Part IV also examines the phenomena of option repricing and
reloadable options. Repricing refers to the lowering of the options’ strike
price when the stock price falls below the original exercise price, a practice
that has recently become increasingly common. The possibility that the
exercise price will be lowered ex post if the stock price does not do well
dilutes ex ante incentives. To be sure, such downward repricing can in theory
be useful going forward in order to retain and to provide incentives to good
managers when the stock price falls for reasons beyond managers’ control.
However, the empirical data suggest that these repricings are, at least in part,
designed to provide executives with extra value beyond what is necessary
for retaining them.
6

Reloadable option plans are option programs under which an
executive exercising options by giving the firm shares that he already owns
receives a new option for each share tendered with the same expiration date
as the old options. These plans allow executives to profit from share price
volatility even if the long-term share performance is flat, and to do so in a
way that is difficult for shareholders to understand. The only possible
justification that can be given for reloadable options is that – given
executives’ freedom to unwind incentives – it might be desirable to have a
mechanism that will replenish those incentives. But this problem could have
been, of course, more easily and effectively addressed by placing some limits
on executives’ freedom to unwind incentives. The puzzling combination of
complete freedom to unwind incentives and reloading options aimed to
correct it, we argue, can best be explained by the rent extraction view.
Finally, we show in Part IV that the rent extraction perspective can
help explain cross-company as well as cross-country differences in executive
pay. The rent extraction view predicts that managers will be able to pay
themselves relatively more in firms in which they have relatively more
power. This is, we show, the case. Surveying the empirical literature, we
find that in the U.S. CEO pay is higher in firms where the CEO is more
powerful vis-à-vis the board, in firms with anti-takeover provisions, in firms
where the institutional investor presence is smaller, and in firms where there
is no large shareholder.
Furthermore, the shareholders of U.S. firms are typically more
dispersed than the shareholders of firms in other developed countries. Thus,
rent extraction can also explain why U.S. managers tend to be paid more
than their counterparts in similar countries.
The conclusion that rent extraction plays a significant role in executive
compensation has important implications for the study, regulation, and
practice of corporate governance. We expect to explore fully these
implications in subsequent work. Here, however, we focus on a prior and
important step – to put forward a systematic framework for the study of rent
extraction in executive compensation, and to show that the evidence is
consistent with and supportive of the view that rent extraction plays an
important role in executive compensation.

II.

ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROCESS

Our analysis focuses on public companies that lack a controlling
shareholder. Managers of these companies have substantial power and
discretion but generally own only a small fraction of the firm’s equity of the
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firm.7 The interests of the shareholder-principals and manager-agents are
not perfectly convergent, and thus there exists an agency problem. The two
views of executive compensation that we discuss both start with the
recognition that there is an agency problem, but they take that recognition in
different directions.
Section A presents the more conventional view among academics –
that executive compensation is one of the instruments that the board uses in
the shareholders’ interest to check the agency problem. In Section B we put
forward a critique of this view. An optimal principal-agent contract would
be chosen if (i) the board were bargaining with the executives at arm’s
length; (ii) the directors or executives were constrained by market forces
from deviating from optimal compensation contracts; or (iii) shareholders
could use the courts to force managers to adopt compensation contracts that
maximize shareholder value. We argue in Section B that none of these
propositions holds, providing reasons to doubt whether the optimal
contracting view fully describes the executive compensation landscape.
Section C puts forward an alternative view – rent extraction – under which
executive compensation is seen as part of the agency problem rather than a
solution to it. Section D concludes by considering the implications of the
norms literature for our examination of executive compensation.
A. The Optimal Contracting View
There is no contract that would perfectly align the interests of
managers and shareholders. The optimal contract is therefore the one that
minimizes agency costs, that is, the sum of contracting, monitoring, other
expenditures made in achieving a certain level of compliance with the
principal’s interest and the costs of the residual divergence.8 Under the
optimal contracting view, this is exactly what executive compensation
packages are designed to do.
The board, attempting to maximize
In 1996, for example, the average CEO of S&P 500 manufacturing
companies owned less than 1% of company shares, while median ownership was
only 0.11%. See Murphy, supra note 3.
8 Thorough review of the optimal contracting literature is beyond the scope
of this paper. Important works on the subject include J. A. Mirrlees, The Optimal
Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization, 7 BELL. J. ECON. 105
(1976); Dilip Mookherjee, Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents, 51 REV. ECON.
STUD. 433 (1984); Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s
Problem, 63 AMER. ECON. REV. 134 (1973); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and
Observability, 10 BELL. J. ECON. 74 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams,
13 BELL. J. ECON. 324 (1982); Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of
the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983); and Robert Gibbons,
Incentives and Careers in Organizations, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND
ECONOMETRICS 1 (D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds., 1997).
7
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shareholder wealth, seeks to establish optimal incentives for the executives.
This view is captured in various formal models that view the board of
directors as selecting an optimal compensation program for shareholders.
As we will discuss, a great deal of empirical work has been done from this
perspective.
The designer attempting to optimize an executive compensation
program would be concerned with (1) attracting and retaining high quality
executives, (2) providing executives with incentives to behave in the
shareholders’ interest both by exerting effort and by making decisions that
will serve those interests, and (3) minimizing overall costs. We will consider
briefly these elements of an optimal contract.
1. Inducing the Executive to Take and Retain Position
A successful CEO of a large public company undoubtedly possesses a
rare combination of skills and instincts. The CEO must manage an
organization with thousands of employees, provide the strategic direction
for the firm, and decide when or whether the company should absorb other
firms or be absorbed. Individuals who possess the necessary attributes may
be scarce,9 and competition among firms, particularly for rising stars, may be
intense. Of course, compensation is not the only factor in attracting and
retaining talent at the very top of the corporate pyramid, but it is an
important one.
To induce an executive to take and retain a position, then, a firm must
offer an overall package of benefits that meets or exceeds the executive’s
opportunity cost. An executive’s appetite for risk is relevant in this regard.
A firm that requires a risk-averse executive to accept risky elements of
compensation will have to provide more total compensation on an expected
value basis to offset the risk-bearing costs.
Under the optimal-contracting view, inducing the executive to take
and retain a position only provides a lower bound on compensation. A firm
should not attempt to pay less than the executive’s reservation wage, but it
may pay more in order to provide desirable incentives. If the firm does
exceed the reservation wage in order to optimize incentives, providing those
incentives through risky compensation devices should not present a problem
to the executive.

See Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G. Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market
for CEO’s: An Analysis of Pay-for-performance Sensitivity (working paper, 1999)
(arguing that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to market returns (as opposed to
company stock returns) may be explained by the inelasticity in the supply of CEO’s
who are able to run large companies).
9
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2. Provision of Incentives
There are two dimensions to the executive incentive problem. A firm
must provide incentives that induce the executive to expend effort as well as
incentives that motivate the executive to take shareholder-regarding
decisions.
As in any agency relationship, there is the risk that the agent may
expend too little effort on the principal’s behalf. That is, executives may
have an incentive to work less than is optimal for shareholders as a group.
This distortion arises because executives enjoy all of the benefits of their
leisure time (or other non-work activities) but capture only a fraction of the
value their work generates for the firm.
The second agency problem in most public companies rests in the
possibility that executives will make decisions that maximize their own
utility but that fail to maximize shareholder value.10 Such decisions might
include the erection of lavish skyscraping office buildings to house corporate
headquarters staff or other excessive perquisite consumption; the selection of
low risk business strategies; attempts to block value-adding takeover
attempts; or the failure to reorganize and reduce the scope of operations
when that is called for. The variety of critical decisions that may be faced by
a CEO is extremely large,11 and the compensation device that properly aligns
incentives in one case may be less effective in another. Moreover, the nature
of the truly key decisions in the coming years often will be unforeseeable,
thus complicating further the design of the optimal compensation plan.
3. Costs
The reservation wage places a lower bound on executive
compensation, but a firm may wish to pay executives much more than the
reservation wage to incentivize behavior that adds shareholder value. Under
the optimal contracting view, shareholders should continue to give value to
executives until the incremental cost of doing so outweighs the value of the
incremental productivity achieved. Optimizing incentives probably will not
require transferring a substantial fraction of firm value to the executives,
however. As we will discuss below, creating desirable incentives is less a
matter of the fraction of value transferred to the executives than the manner
in which value is transferred.12 A compensation plan designer attempting to
See Murphy, supra note 3.
See id.
12 In addition to the direct cost of various compensation devices, a firm must
consider a number of intangible factors in optimizing executive compensation, such
as effects on employee morale and productivity and any social or political
constraints.
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maximize shareholder value would take all of the incentive effects into
account and would then optimize the mix based upon a forecast of the
business environment over the plan period.13
Although the specifics of the optimal executive compensation
program will vary according to the circumstances,14 we can make certain
general predictions about these contracts. First, variable pay schemes, such
as bonus and stock options programs, will be adopted for performance
sensitivity and will thereby shape the individual executive’s incentives.15
Second, compensation devices will be selected and combined in a manner
that attempts to balance incentive generation with the individual executive’s
appetite for risk.16 Third, optimal executive pay might well exceed the
reservation wage in order to provide the incentives discussed above.
B. Critique of the Optimal Contracting View
There are three mechanisms through which executive compensation
programs that optimize incentives and maximize shareholder value might be
produced: (i) the board, acting at arm’s length, selects the compensation
structure that maximizes shareholder value; (ii) although the board acts
under the influence of management, executives are constrained by market
forces to select the structure that best serves shareholder interests; or (iii)
shareholders can use the judicial system to challenge pay arrangements that
are not in shareholders’ interests. This Section shows that not one of these
mechanisms holds.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that an optimal principal-agent
contract will not perfectly align managers’ interests with those of shareholders.
Some deviations cannot be eliminated cost-effectively.
14 In actuality we observe little variety in executive compensation practice.
Most companies utilize very similar salary, annual bonus, and stock option plans.
This uniformity leads one to question whether compensation practice is consistent
with shareholder value maximization. See infra Part IV.B. (explaining why the
uniform use of at-the-money options is likely to be inconsistent with optimal
contracting).
15 Given information asymmetry, it has been suggested that the optimal
compensation plan must include current and future stock price performance. See
John Bizjak et al, Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Investment Behavior, 16 J.
ACCT. ECON. 349 (1993).
16 See Jonathan Eaton and Harvey S. Rosen, Agency Delayed Compensation and
the Structure of Executive Remuneration, 39 J. FIN. 1489 (1984). See also Eugene F.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
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1. Limitations on Arm’s Length Model of Boards
The optimal-contracting literature assumes explicitly or implicitly that
the directors take an adversarial or at least independent position in setting
executive compensation. It is acknowledged that management plays a role
in supplying data and proposals, but the board is viewed as representing
shareholder interests specifically in this process and bargaining with
management in an arm’s length fashion. While the limitations on this model
have been recognized by some students of corporate governance,17 their full
force has not been generally appreciated in the academic literature on
executive compensation. To explore these limitations it will be helpful to
begin by examining the compensation process in greater detail.
In a large public corporation the board of directors is responsible for
determining the compensation of the CEO and senior executives. Typically
the board will adopt a multi-year compensation program that provides
bounds on stock-based awards to the senior executives and lower level
employees, and this plan will be ratified by the shareholders.18 Operating
within the plan, however, the board has the authority to fix the
compensation of senior executives on a periodic basis.19 Today the directors
of essentially all the large, public companies in the U.S. have established
compensation committees to which this function is delegated.20
A
compensation committee typically is comprised of three or four directors,21
and in most firms the independent directors make up a majority of the
committee.22
See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
18 Ratification is virtually certain. Incumbent managers face a meaningful
chance of losing a vote only if there is an active proxy contest. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1990). The question of ratifying stock-based awards
is not sufficiently weighty to induce a challenger to wage a campaign.
19 One researcher finds that shareholder-approved plans in companies that
are larger, more diversified, and more research-intensive tend to provide directors
greater flexibility. See Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation Contracts, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 79 (1997).
20 See KENNETH A. BERTSCH ET AL., BOARD PRACTICES (1998), THE STRUCTURE
AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500 COMPANIES
(1998).
21 See id. (average committee size ranged from 3.3 directors among S&P
Small Cap 600 firms to 4.2 directors among S&P 500 firms).
22 Bertsch, Leahey, and Haun report that in 1998 the average percentage of
independent directors on compensation committees ranged from 83.5% among S&P
Small Cap 600 firms to 91.9% among S&P 500 firms. See id. Directors are defined in
their study as independent if they are not employed by the firm or “affiliated.” A
17
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Three primary factors have led to the increasing use of compensation
committees and the nominal independence of the directors who serve on
them. First, investor advocacy organizations have long pushed for these
improvements in corporate governance structure.23 Second, the tax code
now provides corporations with a strong incentive to establish such
committees. Since 1994, CEO and top officer pay in excess of $1,000,000
annually per executive has not been deductible by a publicly held
corporation unless the excess compensation is based upon the achievement
of performance goals that have been established by a compensation
committee comprised solely of independent outside directors.24 Third, the
use of an independent compensation committee may provide some
additional protection from judicial review or result in more deferential
review of compensation programs.25
Despite the nominal independence of the majority of directors who
serve on compensation committees, there are several reasons to be skeptical
that the process of setting executive compensation approximates the arm’s
length ideal. The key problem is the pervasive influence of management,
and particularly the CEO, on all facets of the process.26
director is considered “affiliated” is she is a former employee, a relative, a service
provider, a supplier, a customer, or an interlocking director. See id. Yermack views
the independence of these outside directors more skeptically, reporting earlier data
indicating that “scores” of compensation committee members “benefited from
personal consulting contracts or from the diversion of company business to their
principal employers.” See David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards
and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997). See also Nikos Vafeas, The
Determinants of Compensation Committee Membership, 8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 356
(2000) (finding that compensation committee members (a) are rarely insiderdirectors, (b) hold no more equity than other board members, (c) tend to sit on
more boards; and (d) tend to be older and have a longer tenure on the board).
23 Current TIAA/CREF policy, for example, states that compensation
committees should be independent, knowledgeable, and willing to use an outside
compensation consultant in negotiating CEO compensation. See Fund Toughens on
Executive Pay, INVESTOR RELATIONS BUS., Apr. 3, 2000.
24 See IRC § 162m. The employees whose compensation is covered by this
rule include the CEO, or individual acting in that capacity, and individuals whose
compensation must be reported under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as the
top four most highly compensated officers other than the CEO. Non-employee
directors who serve as consultants or who otherwise receive direct or indirect
remuneration from the firm in a capacity other than as a director do not qualify as
outside directors for the purposes of § 162m. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3).
25 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986).
26 Even the timing of stock option awards may be influenced to favor senior
management. Yermack finds that that the timing of CEO option awards tends to
immediately precede favorable movements in company stock prices. See David
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements,
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(a) Management Control over Director Appointment
Management’s domination of the compensation process begins with
the selection of the corporation’s directors who form the pool of candidates
from which the compensation committee is selected.
Traditionally, the directors of a corporation serve at the pleasure of
the CEO, and it is generally understood that the CEO dominates the director
nomination process.27 While most boards employ a nominating committee,
the CEO often formally serves on the committee. 28 A 1998 survey found that
only 27% of S&P 1500 firms had fully independent nominating committees.29
When there is no nominating committee or the CEO is involved on the
52 J. FIN. 449 (1997). Managers can also release bad news prior to the grant date of
options in order to reduce the strike price of the options (which is almost always set
to the market price on the grant date). See Keith W. Chauvin and Cathy Shenoy,
Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option Grants, 7 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: CONTRACTING, GOVERNANCE, AND ORGANIZATION 53 (2001).
27 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 597-659 (1982); Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S.
Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88
AMER. ECON. REV. 96 (1998) (suggesting that CEO’s select directors but that their
discretion to do so is circumscribed by explicit or implicit negotiations with the
existing directors). For a review of the economic literature on boards of directors,
see Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (working
paper, 2001).
28 See Anil Shivdasani and David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of
New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1829 (1999)
(reporting that 78% of 341 publicly traded Fortune 500 firms in 1994 had a
nominating committee, and that in 33% of those firms the CEO was a member of the
nominating committee). When a CEO serves on the nominating committee or when
there is no nominating committee, firms appoint fewer independent outside
directors and more outside directors with a conflict of interest. See id., at 1830. There
are, of course, other factors that affect Board composition. See, e.g., Benjamin E.
Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition, 19 RAND
J. ECON. 589 (1988) (finding that firms tend to add insider directors when CEO’s
near retirement and shed inside directors after a new CEO is appointed).
29 See KENNETH A. BERTSCH ET AL., BOARD PRACTICES (1998), THE STRUCTURE
AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500 COMPANIES
(1998). In the study, directors are classified as employees, affiliated, or independent.
A director is deemed affiliated if, as disclosed in the proxy statement, he or she is a
former employee, a relative of an executive, a representative of a charity that
receives contributions from the firm, or a designated interlocking director. See id. at
9-10.
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committee, the stock price reaction to independent director appointments is
significantly lower, and the independent directors appointed are more likely
to serve on a large number of boards and to be stretched thin.30 A CEO’s
influence on the nomination process generally is thought to be considerable,
however, even when he does not sit on the committee.31
(b) Board Dynamics
Most directors believe that their primary responsibility is to monitor
the CEO’s performance, and, if necessary, to fire him and hire a suitable
replacement.32 Outside of this unfortunate circumstance, however, the
directors are expected to support their CEO. Those who cannot do so in
good faith are expected to step down.33 Overall, board meetings and
processes are characterized by an emphasis on courtesy, politeness and
deference to the CEO.34
(i) The “Support or Fire” Model. The role of the board of directors, as it
is normally conceived, is to focus on the big picture and ensure that the
personnel and strategies are in place that will lead to the company’s success.
Although setting executive compensation clearly is a board responsibility, it
is plain that questioning the level or form of executive compensation
proposed by an effective CEO (or his compensation consultant) runs counter
to the predominant “support or fire” model of the board of directors.35
See Anil Shivdasani and David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of
New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1829 (1999).
31 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995).
32 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991); Jay W. Lorsch and
Elizabeth M. MacIver, PAWNS OR POTENTATES? THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S
CORPORATE BOARDS (1989).
33 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995).
34 See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure
of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 863 (1993).
35 Generally, the board is thought to be relatively ineffective in removing
poorly performing CEO’s , and the empirical evidence supports this view. See
Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241
(1989) (finding that only 28 of 176 CEO replacements were explicitly caused by the
board, but noting that the majority of turnovers were unexplained). See also David J.
Denis and Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals,
50 J. FIN. 1029 (1995) (finding that forced CEO resignations are rare and that twothirds of those that occur are caused by factors other than board monitoring, such as
blockholder pressure or a takeover attempt). Cf. Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino
and Laura Starks, The Effectiveness of Internal Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from
30
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Independent directors are thus likely to be reluctant to confront a CEO
regarding the amount of his pay and perquisites.36 This reluctance might
stem from a perception that their effort and scrutiny are better focused on
policy matters,37 or the perception that they are not as knowledgeable about
compensation issues as the management or compensation consultant.
(ii) Social Dynamics. Although the use of a compensation committee
comprised solely of independent directors mitigates to some extent the
influence of the CEO on executive compensation, it is no panacea. The social
dynamics of the board or compensation committee, the members of which
have been selected in large part by the CEO or with his input,38 play an
important role in deterring objection to executive compensation programs. It
is well known that individuals working within a group feel pressure to
placate group members, often at the expense of interests that are not directly
represented at the table.39 The relationship between the CEO and the board
is also likely to produce additional dynamics specific to that particular
setting. Main, O’Reilly, and Wade conclude that the directors who serve on
the committee are influenced by notions of reciprocity, authority, and
CEO Turnover Between 1971 and 1994, 15 (working paper, 1997) (finding that 23.4%
of turnovers in large public US firms during the period 1989-1994 were
involuntary). However, it has been shown that firms with outsider-dominated
boards are significantly more likely to remove the CEO on the basis of poor stock
performance than are firms with insider-dominated boards. See Michael S.
Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (1988). See also
Warren Boeker, Power and Managerial Dismissal: Scapegoating at the Top, 37 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 400 (1992) (finding that the likelihood that poorly performing CEO’s of
semiconductor firms will be replaced decreases as the percentage of inside directors
increases and that excessive executive compensation may contribute to poor
performance, although the link is tenuous). The increased likelihood of the removal
of a poorly performing CEO also may account for the finding of a positive share
price reaction to the appointment of an outside director. See Stuart Rosenstein and
Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J.
FIN. ECON. 175 (1990).
36 However, there is some evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity of
the CEO’s compensation increases with the percentage of independent outside
directors. See Chandra S. Mishra and James F. Nielsen, Board Independence and
Compensation Policies in Large Bank Holding Companies, __ FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
51 (Autumn 2000) (finding evidence that the presence of outside directors in large
bank holding companies increases pay-performance sensitivity).
37 See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982).
38 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995).
39 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of Chief Executive Officers and
Directors of Publicly Held Corporations, ALI-ABA (1999).
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similarity in their deliberations concerning executive compensation.40
Specifically, they find that compensation committee chairmen who are
appointed after the CEO takes office tend to reciprocate by awarding higher
CEO compensation.41 They also find a significant association between the
compensation level of an outsider who serves on the compensation
committee and CEO pay.42
(iii) Self-Serving Cognitive Dissonance. It has also been suggested that a
CEO benefits when an active and well-paid CEO of another firm sits on the
compensation committee.43 This phenomenon could be viewed as pure selfinterest: by approving high compensation for the evaluated CEO, the outside
CEO increases the compensation baseline. Alternatively, it may be seen as a
form of cognitive dissonance wherein the outside CEO internally justifies his
high pay and that of the subject CEO by viewing the compensation data in its
most favorable light. In 1998 25% of compensation committee members were
CEO’s, and some highly compensated CEO’s served on several
compensation committees.44
See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995). This work is influenced by more general research on small group
dynamics. See J. S. Coleman, Constructed Organizations: First Principles, 7 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 7 (1991); R. B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN
PERSUASION (1993).
41 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995).
42 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995); Charles A. O’Reilly et al., Overpaid CEO’s and Underpaid Managers: Equity
and Executive Compensation (working paper, 1998) (finding evidence that CEO pay is
related to the pay levels of the members of the compensation committee). Cf. Maura
A. Belliveau et al., Social Capital at the Top: The Effects of Social Similarity and Status on
CEO Compensation, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1568 (1996) (finding no support for
proposition that social similarity between CEO and chair of compensation
committee increases CEO compensation, but finding that CEO’s with relatively high
social status versus peers and with high social status compared with chairmen of
committees do receive higher compensation).
43 See CRYSTAL, supra note 6. However, there is apparently no effect in CEO
pay when other types of outside executives are on the board. See Ronald C.
Anderson and John M. Bizjak, An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the
Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay (working paper, 2000) (finding
no evidence that CEO’s receive greater pay when executives or retired executives of
other firms sit on the compensation committee).
44 See KENNETH A. BERTSCH ET AL., BOARD PRACTICES (1998), THE STRUCTURE
AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500 COMPANIES 20
(1998).
40

17

(c) Insufficient Incentives
CEO control over the board nomination process and board dynamics
militate against effective executive compensation oversight by independent
directors. Unfortunately, outside directors generally lack the economic
incentive to overcome these forces. The benefits of attempting to curb
excessive executive compensation are low, while the potential costs are high.
(i)
Economic Benefits. Although stock-based compensation for
outside directors is on the rise – 81% of S&P 500 firms awarded directors
stock or options in 199745 – the direct benefit to independent directors of
reducing the CEO's compensation remains insignificant in almost all cases.46
Even if excessive CEO pay results in somewhat higher compensation
throughout the managerial ranks, the impact is unlikely to be felt by a
director who holds only several thousand options.47 Further, as we will
discuss below, the incremental compensation cost incurred by a company
with less than vigilant directors is unlikely to pose a sufficient prize to spark
a hostile takeover and threaten the independent directors’ position on the
board.
(ii) Economic Costs. While the benefit to independent directors of
reducing the CEO's salary is minimal, the cost of trying to do so could be
considerable. As explained previously, CEO’s have significant influence on
the appointment and re-appointment of outside directors. This influence
makes director compensation activism costly in two ways. First, and most
importantly, the CEO has an incentive to throw an uncooperative director off
the board (or not reappoint the director when his term expires). In many
cases the CEO will have the power, through his relationships with other
board members, to do so. If the director is expelled or his directorship is not
See id. at 37.
See George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory,
43 J. FIN. 593 (1988) (arguing that directors fail to create proper executive pay
incentives because the directors bear a large share of nonpecuniary costs and receive
little monetary benefit from improved compensation practices). Options aside,
directors’ fees have increased only modestly over the past two decades. See Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Compensation of Chief Executive Officers and Directors of Publicly Held
Corporations, ALI-ABA (1999) (reporting that the average Fortune 500 director’s fee
increased from $30,000 in 1980 to $50,000 in 1994).
47 On average, directors of S&P 500 firms who received annual options
received approximately 3500 options in 1998. See KENNETH A. BERTSCH ET AL.,
BOARD PRACTICES (1998), THE STRUCTURE AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500 COMPANIES 39 (1998). Independent directors with
more substantial shareholdings might have an incentive to limit executive
compensation. See Richard Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure,
and CEO Compensation (working paper, 1997) (finding that CEO pay is negatively
related to the level of equity holdings of compensation committee members).
45
46
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renewed, the director will lose the salary and benefits he gets from the firm.48
The risk of losing one’s directorship as a result of challenging the CEO’s
compensation must be orders of magnitude greater than the risk presented
by the takeover market.49
Second, there is likely to be a reputational cost of trying to reduce the
CEO’s compensation. In particular, other CEO’s are unlikely to appoint or
reappoint to their boards a director with a reputation for challenging
executive compensation, thus depriving the director of the salary and perks
associated with membership on other boards. Finally, reducing the CEO’s
compensation would also indirectly hurt the independent director if the
director is a CEO whose pay is linked broadly to that of other CEO’s. This is
especially true if the firms appear in each other’s comparative groups when
pay surveys are compiled.50
(iii) The Market for Directors. Fama and Jensen have argued that
independent directors have an incentive to develop reputations as experts in
decision control, which they can do by safeguarding shareholder interests.51
Their idea is as follows: Independent directors normally are CEO’s or other
decision managers in their primary jobs, and the value of their human capital
depends on their decision management reputation. Effective independent
directors signal to the managerial labor market that they are indeed experts
in decision control. Thus, Fama and Jensen might argue that -- in addition to
the direct financial benefit of reducing CEO compensation through its effect
on the value of directors’ options -- there might also be a reputational benefit
to attempting to reduce CEO compensation.
It is reasonable to think that in many cases a CEO would be able to rally a
majority of board members to his side to replace the problem director when his
term expires. Any inside directors can be mobilized by the CEO because they are
beholden to the CEO and their own salary may well depend, at least in part, on the
CEO’s. Outside directors may well go along with the CEO to protect their own
positions, to curry favor with the CEO, who has influence over board compensation,
or simply to make board meetings less fractious and unpleasant.
49 A study of the determinants of CEO compensation in Australia finds that
CEO compensation is decreasing as the amount of equity held by outside directors
and increasing as the salary paid outside directors rises. See Robert Evans and John
Evans, The Influence of Non-Executive Director Control and Rewards on CEO
Remuneration: Australian Evidence (working paper, 2000). The first finding suggests
that outside directors are more likely to curb CEO compensation when the benefits
of reducing CEO compensation are higher. The second suggests that outside
directors are less likely to curb CEO compensation when the costs (the possibility of
losing their seats and the salary that comes with them) are higher.
50 See David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company
News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997).
51 See Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
48
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While this mechanism may work in certain cases, we are skeptical
about its effect on many, if not most, directors. First, the signal provided by
independent directorships is likely to be quite noisy, particularly when the
board is large and responsibilities are diffuse. Second and relatedly, the
managerial labor market is more likely to focus on the manager’s
performance in his primary role rather than in his independent directorships.
More importantly, there are likely to be a considerable number of
independent directors who are paid nontrivial amounts for serving on the
board or who derive significant psychic benefits from sitting on the board of
a publicly traded company. As explained, CEO’s have considerable
influence in the choice of independent directors, and CEO’s seeking directors
prefer nonconfrontational individuals.52 For these directors, the “market” for
directors creates incentives not to challenge the CEO on the issue of his
compensation but rather to accommodate the CEO’s wishes.
Given the process of director selection and retention, board and
committee processes and dynamics, and the lack of an effective incentive
structure, it is unlikely that Fama and Jensen’s “decision control expert”
story will result in independent directors engaging in effective arm’s length
bargaining with the CEO over his compensation. Instead, reputation and
social pressure are likely to play a role in limiting the degree to which the
independent directors are willing to challenge management in this area.
(d) Information Disparities
We have just shown that directors, including independent directors,
are likely to have neither the inclination nor the incentive to engage in arm’s
length bargaining with the CEO. We now wish to point out that even if
directors have the inclination and incentive to negotiate for CEO
compensation that maximizes shareholder value, they will usually lack the
information to do so effectively.
Information is not dispersed uniformly within the corporate
boardroom. Independent directors have limited time and resources available
to devote to increasingly complex compensation issues.53 The CEO, by way
To be sure, one could argue that market forces will prevent CEO’s from
appointing directors who are too pliant and instead will force them to appoint
directors who engage in arm’s length bargaining with the CEO. This is a variant of
the argument that even if CEO’s have influence over the board, market forces will
force the board to negotiate with the CEO at arm’s length. We will address this
argument shortly.
53 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 597-659 (1982); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern
52
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of his personnel department, controls much of the information that reaches
the committee.
TIAA/CREF has recommended that compensation
committees be “willing” to employ an independent compensation
consultant,54 but normally the firm (i.e., management) employs the
consultant that provides the data to the committee.55 Even if the consultant’s
compensation data are perfectly accurate, there is a great deal of flexibility
and discretion involved in choosing the companies that are used for
comparison, determining the economic scenarios that will be presented to
the committee, and generally deciding what data will be presented and
how.56 Because managers choose which compensation consultants to hire,
the consultants have a clear incentive to make recommendations that curry
favor with managers. To be sure, the consultant is somewhat constrained by
reputational considerations – she cannot propose a pay package that is
obviously excessive. But within the range of flexibility and discretion, the
consultant has an incentive to provide information in a way that is most
favorable to managers. Thus, the information presented and the way it is
framed will be chosen with an eye toward maximizing managers’
compensation.
2. Limitations on the Power of Market Forces
Although outside directors are unlikely to bargain with management
over their compensation in a manner that approaches the arm’s length ideal,
we must consider whether the CEO and more junior executives will be
induced by market forces not to push for anything other than optimal
compensation contracts. There is an important school of thought in
corporate law and finance scholarship that takes the view that markets for
managerial labor, corporate control, capital, and products effectively align
management and shareholder interests.57 As one of us has argued in earlier
work, however, these market mechanisms cannot be relied upon to align
Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 863
n. 35 (1993).
54 See Fund Toughens on Executive Pay, INVESTOR RELATIONS BUS., Apr. 3, 2000.
55 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991).
56 See id. As we discuss below, compensation consultants have an incentive
to produce data that favors the insiders who select them. Consultants must protect
their reputation for accuracy, of course, but they can safely operate within a range
of discretion. Thus, the information provided and the way in which it is framed
would tend to be skewed in favor of those who hire them - managers.
57 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Daniel R. Fischel, The Race to
the Bottom Revisited: Reflection on Recent Development in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76
NW. U. L. REV. 913 (1982).
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managers’ and shareholders’ interests with respect to significantly
redistributive issues – decisions by which the managers can transfer to
themselves value that is substantial relative to the resulting loss to
shareholders.58 Executive compensation, which approaches a direct transfer
from shareholders to management, would seem to be an especially clear case
of a significantly redistributive issue for which market forces will provide
insufficient discipline. We will briefly review the market forces that bear
upon managerial behavior activity and discuss why they are unlikely to
impose significant restraints on executive compensation.
(a) Managerial Labor Markets
Several labor market mechanisms tend to align the interests of
executives with those of shareholders. Executives’ compensation packages
(as well as their equity holdings) provide the most direct incentives. The
typical senior executive’s compensation package is composed of base salary,
annual bonus, stock options and/or restricted shares, and often other longterm incentive elements.59 Each of these components is sensitive to firm
performance to some degree and contributes to incentive alignment,
although performance-based adjustments to salary and bonus tend to be
sluggish and relatively unimportant.60 Among the firm’s executives, the
CEO typically holds the greatest number of shares and options. Hence the
CEO’s wealth will fluctuate the most in absolute terms with firm value.61
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J.
Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52
STANFORD L. REV. 775 (1999).
59 See Murphy, supra note 3.
60 Salary figures are largely determined through the use of compensation
surveys and a process of benchmarking against industry peers. As a result, CEO
base salaries historically have been highly correlated with firm size. See George P.
Baker, et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988).
However, more recent evidence suggests that this correlation is diminishing and
that CEO salary and bonus payments are becoming more sensitive to performance.
See Murphy, supra note 3; Paul L. Joskow and Nancy L. Rose, CEO Pay and Firm
Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures, NBER
(working paper, 1996). Nevertheless, Perry and Zenner report that in the mid-1990s
only 2-4% of the sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder value is attributable to
annual cash compensation and long-term incentive plans. The remaining sensitivity
arises from share and option holdings. See Perry and Zenner, supra note 1.
61 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, Performance Incentives
Within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility (working paper, 1999).
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Over the past two decades the sensitivity of the average CEO’s wealth to
firm performance has increased by an order of magnitude with the explosive
growth of stock option plans, but, given the enormous size of large U.S.
companies, the absolute sensitivity of CEO wealth to performance remains
small. For a $1000 change in firm value, the wealth of the average CEO of a
large, public corporation currently changes only by about $10.62
All else being equal, then, a CEO who wrote himself a check for an
extra $1000 would net about $990 after taking into account the impact of the
change in firm value on his shares and options. But all else is not equal.
Although there appears to be a widening gap between the compensation of
U.S. CEO’s and junior executives,63 there is some evidence that when CEO’s
are overpaid (or underpaid), a diminishing echo effect is felt throughout the
organization.64 Moreover, inequity between the compensation of the CEO
and his subordinates has been shown to be associated with higher rates of
managerial turnover.65 Hence, a CEO would have to take these factors into
account prior to awarding himself a pay raise.
Nonetheless, the sensitivity of their wealth to firm value alone would
dissuade few CEO’s from increasing their compensation. It is difficult to
gauge the significance of the compensation echo effect, but one indication
may be provided by the distribution of options. In 1998, the CEO’s of S&P
1500 corporations received 14.2% of all options issued while the top five

Based on 1974-1986 data, Jensen and Murphy calculated median CEO
wealth to shareholder value sensitivity of $3.25 per $1000, and this figure included
an adjustment for risk of dismissal. See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). More
recently Perry and Zenner have shown that in 1997 the median S&P 1500 CEO stood
to gain or lose $11.50 per $1000 of shareholder gain or loss. See Perry and Zenner,
supra note 1. Similarly, Hall and Liebman have estimated 1998 CEO wealth to
shareholder value sensitivity of approximately $11 per $1000 based on a firm with
market capitalization of $1 billion. See Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The
Taxation of Executive Compensation NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000). These latter
figures exclude adjustment for risk of dismissal.
63 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 67 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995).
64 See Charles A. O’Reilly, et al., Overpaid CEO’s and Underpaid Managers:
Equity and Executive Compensation (working paper, 1998).
65 See id. Vertical pay inequity within an organization may also be associated
with poorer product quality. See Douglas M. Cowherd and David I. Levine, Product
Quality and Pay Equity Between Lower-Level Employees and Top Management: An
Investigation of Distributive Justice Theory, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 302 (1992).
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executives received 30%.66 If the distributive pattern of overcompensation is
at all similar, there remains an order of magnitude difference between the
direct gain and cost to the CEO of increasing executive pay levels.67
Of course, compensation is just one element of the managerial labor
market. Executives are also concerned with the possibilities of promotion or
dismissal and with being tapped for higher-level positions by other firms.
However, the possibility of promotion is of diminished significance for the
CEO – the person driving the executive compensation process. For the CEO,
internal promotion is, of course, impossible. To be sure, external promotion
is always a possibility. She could become the CEO of a larger or more
prestigious firm. But most CEO positions are filled internally.68 Thus for the
CEO there may well be few other jobs that are both available and more
desirable than her current one. Finally, the ability to get those jobs will
depend on the CEO's overall performance at her current firm, not on the
amount of rent extracted. 69
The risk of being fired depends more upon overall performance than
on the CEO's level of compensation, and this risk is small in any event.70 In
See Kathy B. Ruxton, EXECUTIVE PAY, 1997: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
COMPENSATION AT S&P SUPER 1,500 COMPANIES AS REPORTED IN 1997, Investor
Responsibility Research Center (1998).
67 Using these figures as an example, a CEO direct pay boost of $142 would
result in a total firm-wide compensation increase of $1000, which would result in
about a $10 cost to the CEO on his stock and options. This calculation assumes,
however, that overcompensation throughout the ranks has no impact on
productivity, which is unlikely. More realistically, overcompensation results in
increased productivity, but at an insufficient level to offset the higher payments.
Thus shareholder value falls, but not to the full extent of the overcompensation, and
hence the cost to the CEO as a share/option holder would be even less.
68 See C. Edward Fee and Charles J. Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputations
in the Market for CEO Talent 10 (working paper, 2001) (reporting that in a sample of
1200 CEO hires during the period 1990-98, 73.5% were internal hires).
69 The probability of being hired as CEO for another firm (which is low), is
positively related to the stock price performance at one’s current firm. See C.
Edward Fee and Charles J. Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for
CEO Talent (working paper, 2001). However, the initial hiring grant for the new job
is highly correlated with the value of unvested options and restricted stock the CEO
leaves behind. See id, at 39. Thus, on balance, CEO’s contemplating moving to
another CEO position would appear to have an incentive to inflate their
compensation as much as possible.
70 Murphy finds that departure rates for the CEO’s of S&P 500 bottomquartile performers averaged 15% from 1970 through 1995, while departure rates
for the remaining S&P 500 CEO’s averaged 11%. See Murphy, supra note 3. For
other work on executive turnover and firm performance, see Anne T. Coughlan and
Ronald M. Schmidt, Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm
Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 7 J. ACCT. ECON. 43 (1985); Jerold B. Warner
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their seminal 1990 study, Jensen and Murphy calculated that the median
CEO suffers a dismissal-related wealth reduction of $0.30 per $1000
reduction in shareholder value,71 and no clear time trend in the firm
performance/dismissal relationship has been established.72 It seems highly
unlikely that the small added threat of dismissal would dissuade a CEO from
granting himself and the other executives increased compensation.73
(b) Market for Corporate Control
The market for corporate control is also viewed as a strong force
aligning the interests of management and shareholders.74 A company that
experiences a relative drop in share price should become more vulnerable to
a takeover attempt, and the executives of a firm that is taken over face a high
risk of loss of position, pay, and perquisites. Despite widespread adoption of
poison pills and other takeover defenses, the corporate control market has
remained active.75
The takeover threat, however, is unlikely to discourage management
from seeking an increase in executive compensation. Consider an executive
of a $10 billion company who contemplates increasing executive
compensation by $100 million over the next several years. Obviously, the
et al, Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461 (1988); Michael S.
Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (1988); Wayne H.
Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Turnover,
44 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1997); Warren Boeker, Power and Managerial Dismissal:
Scapegoating at the Top, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 400 (1992); Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R.
Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis,
48 J. FIN. 425 (1993). For analysis of executive turnover abroad see Steven Kaplan,
Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the United
States, 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994); Steven Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover, and
Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994); Jun-Koo Kang and
Anil Shivdasani, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover
in Japan, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (1995).
71 See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
72 See Murphy, supra note 3.
73 The junior executives are concerned about promotion within or outside the
firm, but they have much less say in the compensation setting process and are much
less likely than the CEO to be tainted by any perception of excessive compensation.
74 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 564 (1984); Henry G. Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
75 See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 271 (2000) (reporting that nearly 70
hostile bids were made in 1995, a figure that exceeds the pace of the 1980s, and that
negotiated deals reached an all time high in 1998).
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direct benefit to the executive is very large. The cost to the executive is the
enhanced risk of takeover and ouster, but the increase in takeover risk
resulting from a 1% reduction in firm value is bound to be quite limited.76
Commentators who believe most fervently in the disciplining force of
takeovers admit that control transactions are very costly and useful only as a
response to substantial performance shortfalls.77 Excessive compensation
may be a symptom of more pervasive management shortcomings, but the
limited evidence available does not support the proposition that
overcompensation increases takeover risk. A study of Forbes 800 firms in the
1980s determined that takeover bids were more common in industries in
which CEO’s were overpaid, but found no significant difference between the
compensation of the CEO’s of firms that were and were not targeted for
takeover within these industries.78 If there is an added risk of takeover, it
appears to be small, and it is not likely to deter executives from pushing for
the highest possible compensation.
(c) Market for Additional Capital
Another source of market discipline arises from the possibility that the
firm will need to return to the market for additional equity capital in order to
support expansion – a prospect that would cause a value-maximizing
management team to maintain restraint and develop a reputation as
conservative self-compensators. The failure of management to do so,
however, is unlikely to impede their access to equity capital or limit their
expansionary aims. Instead, a pattern of excessive self-compensation will
raise slightly a firm’s cost of capital. Future investors will pay something
less for the firm’s shares in a secondary offering based on their recognition of
management’s excessive compensation, so more shares would have to be
issued to raise a given amount of capital. Of course this effect leads to a
reduction in value that is borne by all existing shareholders, including the
executive team, but again the impact of this reduction in share value on
managerial wealth and the likelihood of ouster via takeover will be
considerably less than the direct benefit of taking additional compensation.

This simplified example ignores the compensation echo effect we
mentioned in the prior subsection, but that effect does not disturb the conclusion
that the direct benefit of increased compensation overwhelms the expected cost.
77 Easterbrook suggests that a potential increase in value of about 20% is
needed to trigger a control transaction. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’
Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 567
(1984).
78 See Anup Agrawal and Ralph A. Walking, Executive Careers and
Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids, 49 J. FIN. 985, 986 (1994).
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(d) Product Markets
A final possible external constraint on management behavior is that
created by competition in product markets. In a competitive market, it is
argued, inefficient behavior produces competitive disadvantage, shrinking
profits, and business contraction or failure.79 Although this effect may
discourage management from acting in ways that decrease productivity, the
redistribution of firm profits from shareholders to executives has no
significant effect on the operational efficiency of the company,80 and hence
this factor will not inhibit excessive compensation.
(e) Overall Force
Even in aggregate the foregoing market forces are unlikely to impose
significant constraints on executive self-compensation. The analysis and
limited evidence indicate that the incentives for restraint provided by the
executives’ stock and option holdings vastly outweigh any other incentives.
These direct incentives are far from sufficient to induce managerial selfdiscipline with regard to such a significantly redistributive matter as
executive compensation.
This conclusion is supported by evidence that suggests that market
constraints generally are not binding on executive compensation. Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker find that executive compensation is greater when
the arm’s length bargaining process is undermined. 81 CEO compensation is
greater, for example, when the CEO also serves as board chairman; when the
board is large or consists of a greater fraction of outside directors; and when
more outside directors are appointed by the current CEO or are burdened
with some conflict of interest, are old, or serve on five or more boards.82 This
suggests that it is not markets but rather the power of the CEO vis-à-vis the
board that can constrain executive compensation.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare:
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 557 (1984).
80 As noted earlier, there is evidence that inequity between CEO
compensation and compensation at lower levels is associated with increased
managerial turnover. Higher turnover could have some impact on operational
efficiency. See Charles A. O’Reilly et al., Overpaid CEO’s and Underpaid Managers:
Equity and Executive Compensation (working paper, 1998).
81 See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999).
82 See id.
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3. The Practical Absence of Judicial Review
Although neither market forces nor bargaining between the board and
the CEO is likely to ensure optimal contracting, in theory such contracting
could arise if shareholders could use the courts to throw out compensation
packages that do not maximize shareholders’ value. In fact, corporate law
permits shareholders to challenge legally a particular compensation package
under a variety of doctrines. However, the obstacles to the success of such a
lawsuit all but ensure that courts do not review the substantive merits of
management compensation arrangements. Thus, as a practical matter,
judicial review fails to impose any constraint on executive pay.83
To overturn a board’s decision to grant a particular pay package,
shareholders would be required to show that the board had violated its duty
of care, committed “waste,” or breached the duty of loyalty. As we will
explain, it is all but impossible to prove any of these violations. Before
describing each of these legal standards, however, it will be useful to
examine the procedural barrier that make it extremely unlikely that
shareholders will even get to the stage where such claims are heard.
Excessive compensation does not hurt shareholders directly but rather
indirectly through their equity interests in the firm. Thus, shareholders
cannot sue the board directly for claims relating to executive pay. To
challenge board decisions involving executive compensation, shareholders
generally must file a derivative suit -- a suit brought on behalf of the
corporation -- that alleges that the corporation has been hurt by the board’s
decision (in this case, to grant excessive pay to management).
Because shareholders generally do not make decisions on behalf of the
corporation board – these decisions are made by the firm’s officers and
directors – the courts severely restrict shareholders’ ability to proceed with a
derivative suit. The most important procedural restriction is the “demand
requirement.” Under this requirement, shareholders must “make demand”
on the board to investigate the problem and take whatever steps are
necessary to correct it. If there is a failure to make demand, the board can
See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 59, 80 (1992) (reporting that in
almost all cases since 1900 involving publicly traded firms courts have refused to
overturn compensation decisions). There are other corporate law mechanisms that
could in theory be used to give shareholders some influence over executive
compensation decisions. For example, shareholders often vote on firm-wide option
plans and individual shareholders sometimes put forward shareholder resolutions
challenging the board’s compensation decision making. However, it is widely
believed that neither of these mechanisms provides a meaningful constraint on the
pay arrangements for executives. We will examine these two mechanisms in a later
version of this paper.
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usually have the case dismissed.84 An exception is made, however, when
shareholders can show that such a demand would be “futile.”
If the shareholders make demand on the board to pursue the litigation
(which, recall is against one or more members of the board itself), the board
will take control over the suit.85 The board will then almost always dismiss
the lawsuit.86 If the board appears to have acted independently, and to have
conducted a reasonable investigation of the allegations, the court will grant
the motion to dismiss, ending the legal challenge to the compensation.
Because demand leads in effect to the termination of the lawsuit,
shareholders must claim that demand on the board is futile. Establishing
demand futility requires the plaintiff to offer “particularized facts” that
either (1) create a reasonable doubt as to the independence of the majority of
the board of directors or (2) show that the board’s decision (approval of the
compensation package) is not protected by the “business judgment rule” –
the doctrine that shelters almost all board decisions from review. Both of
these are difficult for shareholders to accomplish early in the litigation,
especially because the plaintiff has not had the opportunity to conduct
“discovery.”87
Consider the first approach: creating a reasonable doubt as to the
independence of the board. To create such a doubt, one would generally
need to show that the directors on the compensation committee have a direct
financial interest in the compensation decision, or that they are beholden to
the controlling person through personal or other relationships.88 Thus, by
staffing the compensation committee with nominally independent directors,
firms can in effect make it impossible for shareholders to satisfy the futility

See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW
QUARTERLY (2001).
85
See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW
QUARTERLY(2001).
86 Id. The failure of the board to deal with the demand in good faith or to
conduct a reasonable investigation could constitute a wrongful refusal of demand,
giving control over the litigation back to the shareholders. See id, at _____.
87
See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW
QUARTERLY (2001).
88 It is not sufficient to show, for example, that an executive whose pay is
being challenged owned a large percentage of the firm’s shares and personally
selected the directors. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1983).
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requirement by creating a reasonable doubt as to the independency of the
board.89
The second approach to establishing demand futility -- showing that
the board’s decision is not protected by the business judgment rule -requires the plaintiff to provide evidence indicating that the board failed to
fulfill either its “procedural due care” or its “substantive due care” duties. A
board fails to fulfill its “procedural due care” duties by being uninformed. A
board fails to fulfill its “substantive due care” duties by making an irrational
decision and thereby committing “waste” or by making a “gift” unsupported
by any consideration. However, the board can easily fulfill both types of
duties. The board can satisfy its procedural duties by reading some
materials and asking some questions. Similarly, it can easily meet its
substantive due process duties by coming up with a justification for the
executives’ salary. Support can be marshaled for even the most patently
unreasonable plans.90
If shareholders were to satisfy the demand futility requirement –
either by showing that the board was not independent or that the board
likely violated its duty of care, they might still face additional obstacles
before they could get to trial. In addition to (or after) arguing that the suit
should be dismissed for failure to make demand, the board might also move
to dismiss the suit for failure to state a legally recognized claim. It could then
move to dismiss through a summary judgment motion, which would argue
that the suit should be dismissed because plaintiffs have misinterpreted the
law. Only after shareholders had overcome these hurdles could there be a
trial. At trial, shareholders would still need to convince the court that the
board violated its duty of loyalty or duty of care. If they could do so, the
decision would then likely be appealed.91
Cf. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1996) (rejecting
shareholders’ demand futility claim on the ground that the compensation
committee consisted of independent directors).
90 See Mark J. Lowenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for Reform, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 201, 214 (1996) (reporting that there have been
no appellate court cases involving publicly traded firms affirming an order to
reduce managerial compensation on the theory of gift or waste). See also Linda J.
Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive
Pay, 68 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 59 (1992).
91
Thomas and Martin compiled statistics on plaintiff’s success rates at
various stages of the litigation process when challenging management
compensation of a publicly traded firm. See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J.
Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, forthcoming,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY (2001). They found that 47% of
plaintiffs survive motions to dismiss for failure to make demand; 26% prevail in
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim; 28% survive motions for summary
judgment; of these, 39% win at trial and 39% win at appeals. They calculate that if
89
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The recent case involving payments to a departing Disney executive,92
illustrates the hostility of courts to claims regarding executive compensation.
In the process of hiring Michael S. Ovitz, the Disney board approved a “NoFault Termination” agreement with under which Ovitz would get, upon
termination, a lump sum payment equal to the present value of all of the
payments under his employment contract, an additional payment equal to
“the product of $7.5 million times the number of fiscal years remaining
under the employment contract,” and the immediate vesting of 3 million
stock options for Disney shares. Not long after Ovitz began working at
Disney, he quit, triggering the payments and vesting.
The fact pattern suggested that the board had been uninformed when
approving the agreement with Ovitz and that the termination payments had
little business justification.93 Shareholders sued the board. The Delaware
Chancery court dismissed the suit on the ground that the shareholders did
not show demand futility and failed to state a legally cognizable claim. The
Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. The substantive merit of the case was
never considered.
C. The Rent Extraction View
1. Power and Rents
The other view of executive compensation, the rent extraction view,
also starts with recognition of the shareholder/management agency
problem, but in this model executive compensation is seen as part of the
problem rather than a remedy to it. Under the optimal contracting view, the
board sets the compensation program to alleviate the agency problem
between shareholders and executives. In contrast, under the rent extraction
view, the executives, as part of the agency problem, influence pay levels to
provide themselves with rent.
The rent extraction story picks up with our critique of the optimal
contracting model. Under rent extraction corporate managers are firmly in
control. The outside directors are connected to the executives by bonds of
interest, collegiality, or affinity. These outside directors may rise up and
displace a particularly poorly performing CEO, but short of this they will be
strongly inclined to defer to and support the CEO’s judgment. Given the
substantial influence of the CEO and the CEO’s management team over even
plaintiffs were forced to go through every stage of litigation, the likelihood of a
successful outcome at the end of the process is .52%. See id at ________.
92 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
93 See Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to
Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, forthcoming, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW
QUARTERLY (2001).
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nominally independent directors, bargaining over executive compensation
does not approach the arm’s length ideal. Rather, executives use their power
to set a high level of compensation, and outside directors cooperate with
management at least to some extent.94
The excess pay that executives are able to extract constitutes rent. It
represents value that they capture due to their positional power.
Specifically, the amount of rent that an executive extracts is the excess of the
pay obtained by him over what he would have received under a contract that
maximizes shareholder value. It is important to emphasize that the cost to
the shareholders resulting from the extraction of rent might well be higher
than the amount of the rent itself. To the extent that extraction of rent
involves efficiency costs – due, in particular, to the adoption of compensation
arrangements that are not efficient – the shareholders’ loss will be larger than
the rent extracted by managers.
This rent is received by the executive or team of executives in whose
hands power is largely concentrated in a company with dispersed
ownership. Many companies have a powerful CEO, and in those cases rent
extraction will be concentrated in the hands of the CEO. In some companies
power might be shared by a small team of top executives who together
extract rent. Our discussion regarding extraction will refer to the rents
captured by the powerful CEO or the executive team, as the case may be.
2. The “Outrage Constraint”
The rent extraction model does not imply that there are no constraints
on compensation or the rent that executives can capture. The most important
limit on executive compensation under this model likely would arise from
what we will refer to as the “outrage constraint.” Directors would be
reluctant to approve, and executives would be hesitant to seek,
compensation arrangements that might be viewed by observers as
outrageous.95
In this section we will present the rent extraction model as if it and optimal
contracting were competing, mutually exclusive accounts of compensation. As will
become clear in subsequent sections of the paper, we believe that both mechanisms
play a role in the compensation-setting process of most firms.
95
Jensen and Murphy, whose work we address later and whose approach to
executive compensation is very different from ours, have also suggested that
external perceptions might limit directors’ ability to give executives large
compensation packages. They refer to this limit as a “political constraint.” See
Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). Jensen and Murphy thus share our view that
there are constraints on executive compensation imposed by the attitudes of persons
outside the firm. The difference is that, as we discuss later, Jensen and Murphy
believe that the optimal level of compensation might well be above the limit
94
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Crossing the outrage constraint could hurt directors and executives in
several ways. First, violating outrage constraint might produce various
social and reputational costs to directors. Although outside directors are
willing to support and defer to executives, there is a limit to how far they
will go. Professional reputation is very important to the typical outside
director who does not join a board for the pay. In addition to the
opportunity for intellectual challenge and stimulation, independent directors
join for the prestige and connections that the posts give them.96 Hence,
outside directors would be loath to approve a compensation plan that would
embarrass them or compromise their reputations.97 Independent directors
would be concerned about how such plans might be viewed by the media or
various social or professional groups whose opinions are important to the
directors. As a result, they would support management only insofar as the
compensation proposal does not cross the outrage constraint.
Crossing the outrage constraint might also involve costs associated
with an increased likelihood of being ousted in a control contest. Although
limited reductions in corporate value are unlikely by themselves to trigger a
takeover, outrageous compensation might lead to negative control effects.
For example, institutional investors might view such compensation as a
signal that the executives or directors are especially insensitive to
shareholder interests and thus might be less willing to support the
incumbents in a control contest.
Given a weaker base of management
support, a contest for control, through either a proxy contest or a takeover
bid, might be more likely to arise.
Although a small group of observers – be they sophisticated market
participants or researchers – might identify a compensation scheme as
involving an especially egregious amount of rent, these observations by
themselves would not constitute a violation of the outrage constraint. For
executives or directors to be adversely affected in a material way through the
channels discussed above, such observations need to be made by relevant
groups, such as institutional investors en masse, the media, and/or social
established by these external constraints, whereas we believe that the optimal level
of compensation is likely to be below this limit.
96 See JAY W. LORSCH AND ELIZABETH M. MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES?
THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 23-31 (1989) (responding to survey,
outside directors reported that compensation was a relatively unimportant
consideration in joining boards, while prestige and establishing contacts/enhancing
business relationships were moderately important factors).
97 Firms have been found to be responsive to financial press and institutional
investor criticism of executive compensation arrangements. This finding is
consistent with the existence of an outrage limitation on compensation. See Marilyn
F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive Compensation
(working paper, 1997).
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and professional groups about whose views the executives and directors
care. Therefore, violation of the outrage constraint greatly depends
importantly on the extent to which rent extraction is clearly apparent to
outsiders, not just (or even mainly) upon how much rent is extracted.
3. The Critical Role of “Camouflage”
Because of the importance of the outrage constraint, one prediction of
the rent extraction view is that compensation plan designers will seek to
camouflage the presence of rent extraction and conceal its magnitude. As we
have discussed, a large amount of compensation will not by itself trigger the
outrage constraint. Triggering will occur only if there is widespread
recognition that the level of compensation is not the result of a contract
designed in the shareholders’ interest, but rather reflects a large extraction of
rent. Thus, crossing the outrage constraint depends on the extent to which
the rent extraction can be easily and distinctly identified. A large extraction
of rent will not cause the executives or directors harm if it can be dressed,
packaged, or hidden – in short, camouflaged – so that it is not readily
apparent as such.
Accordingly, under the rent extraction view, managers will prefer
compensation structures and processes that enable the extraction of rents to
be camouflaged as optimal contracting, and efforts will be made to obfuscate
the compensation data and otherwise plausibly justify the compensation
programs. As we discuss in detail in Part III below, the outrage constraint
and the resulting camouflage motive might explain why firms rely so heavily
on compensation surveys and consultants. These tools might be used to
explore and press the limits of justifiable compensation and to legitimize the
compensation program selected, rather than to optimize the pay package.
Furthermore, as we will examine in detail in Part IV, many aspects of
existing compensation practice and design can be explained by
considerations of camouflage.
One might ask how any observer can tell that rent extraction is taking
place if it is camouflaged. To be sure, sometimes no observer will be able to
do so, but the presence of camouflage does not imply that rent extraction will
not be identifiable to any observer. For camouflage to be successful, as we
discussed earlier, it need only prevent rent extraction from being easily
identifiable to certain large groups of outside observers. Thus, it is in no way
a contradiction for a researcher to view a certain compensation practice as
being likely to include camouflaged rent. Such a judgment simply reflects
the conclusion that the researcher has found to her own satisfaction that the
compensation package or program is likely not to serve shareholders’
interests, but rather to represent rent extraction.
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It is worth noting that the location of the outrage constraint and the
methods of camouflage might change over time. When CEO’s benchmark
their compensation against each other and all aim to be at or above average,
an upward ratcheting effect occurs.98
Furthermore, new and more
performance-responsive compensation devices have tended to supplement
rather than substitute for traditional compensation elements.99 Thus an
executive pay plan that would have been considered patently unjustifiable
ten years ago might produce below average compensation today.100 Under
the rent extraction view, then, different equilibrium levels might arise.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, because of the outrage
constraint and the camouflage motive, there may be a significant overlap
between rent extraction and incentive generation. Payments that are
consistent with incentive generation might be relatively easy to justify and
defend. The point of the rent extraction model, however, is that the
executive compensation outcome would deviate from that which would be
in the shareholders’ interest. When rent extraction is at work, executives will
receive more compensation than they would have received under an optimal
principal-agent contract. Compensation structures may then be adopted that
provide sub-optimal incentives but serve to increase executive wealth.
Rent extraction, then, can yield a deviation from optimality in both the
magnitude and structure of executive compensation. The extent of that
deviation, of course, is the critical issue. An adherent of the optimal
contracting view would not be distressed to find that rent extraction leads to
some minor deviation from the optimal contract. Our theoretical analysis,
however, suggests that rent extraction may well play a major role.
4. More and Less Power
Because rent extraction is associated with managerial power, an
important element of the rent extraction view is that there is a correlation
between managerial power and rent. Executives generally have at least
some power and therefore can extract at least some rent, but the particular
characteristics of the firm, especially its ownership and board structure, give
its executives more or less power. Under the rent extraction view, the
greater the CEO’s power, the higher the rent will tend to be.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (working paper, 1997).
100 While the U.S. executive pay baseline continues to rise, some external
benchmarks have remained steadier. Thus, comparisons with executives of nonU.S. firms and U.S. shop floor to CEO pay multiples may play an increasingly
important role in setting the outrage constraint.
98
99
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The power of the CEO will depend in large part on the ownership
structure of the firm. The more shares owned by the CEO, the greater will be
her influence on director elections and her ability to thwart or discourage a
hostile takeover attempt. The more shares owned by unrelated parties, the
less will be the CEO’s influence on director elections and the more
vulnerable the CEO will be to a hostile takeover attempt. Thus, the power of
the CEO will tend to increase with the percentage of shares he owns, and
tend to decrease with the percentage of shares owned by outside
blockholders.
The CEO’s power will also depend on the organization and
composition of the board. Because a classified board makes a hostile
takeover more difficult, a CEO’s power will tend to be higher if the board is
classified. The CEO’s power will also depend on the number of inside
directors and the number of outside directors. Also relevant is the number of
outside directors over whom the CEO has some kind of influence. For
example, an outside director might follow a CEO’s wishes because he is a
long-standing friend of the CEO or he is grateful that the CEO has placed
him on the board.
We will discuss the correlation between managerial power and rent
extraction in more detail, as well as present evidence of such a correlation, in
Part IV.G. For now, however, it is worth pointing out that this element of the
rent extraction view can explain much of what is observed in the world of
executive compensation.
D. Conforming to Norms
In the last 10 years there has been much interest among legal scholars in
the existence and evolution of “norms” and their effect on behavior in a wide
variety of contexts. Recently, legal scholars have focused their attention on
the effect of norms in the context of corporate law and corporate
governance.101 It is thus natural to ask whether norms -- and in particular
See e.g., Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, Trust Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
REVIEW 1735 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr. Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation,
149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 2151 (2001); Robert Cooter and
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1717 (2001); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of
Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1869
(2001); Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1901 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney and Chris
W. Sanchirico, Competing Norms and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?, 149
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 2027 (2001); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative
Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 2083 (2001); Edward B. Rock and
101
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the pressure to conform to norms -- might play a role in executive
compensation.
As used in legal scholarship, the term “norms” has been used generally to
refer to non-legal rules of conduct and behavior. Some norms simply reflect
patterns of behavior that have arisen and tend to persist primarily because
actors observe each other behaving in a particular way and believe that there
is a potential cost to deviating from it. Suppose, for example, that every year
the partners of ABC law firm use law firm funds to give each of their
secretaries a Christmas bonus. Beth, a partner at ABC law firm, learns that
every other partner at ABC law firm is going to give his or her assistant $500
in cash. She must decide how much to give her assistant. If she gives less
than this amount, her assistant might feel insulted. If she gives more, other
partners might feel obligated to give a larger bonus next year lest their
assistants feel insulted, and this may cause the other partners to resent Beth
for “wasting” the firm’s funds and reducing their profits. Thus Beth will
have an incentive to stick to the established pattern of giving assistants a
Christmas bonus of $500 in cash.
The pressure to conform is likely to play an important role in executive
compensation. At any given point in time, this pressure is likely to affect
both the amount and structure of executive compensation arrangements
recommended by compensation committees and approved by boards. As we
have alluded to earlier and will discuss in more detail later, compensation
committees recommend pay arrangements based in large part on the
compensation packages they see at other firms. There is clearly a desire on
the part of such committees and the board to conform to “the norm” or at
least to be seen as conforming to the norm.
At the minimum, the desire to conform makes any movement from one
equilibrium to another much slower and more gradual. Compensation
committees’ preference to conforming to the “norm” and fear of deviating
substantially from it means that the evolution of compensation arrangements
will take more time. Thus, whatever the nature of the current equilibrium,
movement from it will be “sticky” due to the desire to conform to established
patterns.

Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Laws, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1619 (2001); Mark J.
Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 2063 (2001); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming
in Corporate Law, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1811 (2001); E.
Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate
Governance Practices – or Vice Versa?, 149 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
2279 (2001).
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The main point we wish to emphasize is that the desire to conform to
established patterns cannot provide a basis for a full account of executive
compensation. The stickiness arising from the tendency to conform implies
only that movement from one equilibrium to another will be very slow. It
cannot explain why we are in a particular equilibrium to begin with. More
importantly, given that patterns of executive compensation change over
time, norms cannot tell us much about the new equilibrium to which we are
heading, however slowly. To provide a full account of executive
compensation, norms must be combined with another theory such as optimal
contracting or rent extraction.
A theory combining norms and optimal contracting would predict that
the evolution of executive compensation over time, although slowed by the
tendency to follow established practices, is shaped overwhelmingly by the
forces of optimal contracting. That is, as changing circumstances make the
existing equilibrium suboptimal, boards induced by market pressure will
move toward what would be the new optimal arrangement. Although the
stickiness introduced by the desire to conform would prevent adjustment
from being instantaneous, the forces of optimal contracting would be strong
enough to ensure that this movement is fast enough that executive
compensation does not deviate for a long time from what participants
recognize to be the optimal arrangement.
In contrast, a theory combining norms and rent extraction predicts that
the evolution of executive compensation over time is shaped, at least in part,
by the desire of executives to extract more rents from their firms. When
changing circumstances create an opportunity to extract additional rents -either by moving the outrage constraint or by giving rise to a new means of
camouflage -- managers will seek to take full advantage of it and will push
firms toward an equilibrium in which they can do so. However, the
stickiness due to norms will slow this movement somewhat.
Thus, even though we recognize the importance of the pressure to
conform we need another theory to explain why we are at the current
equilibrium and what forces will move us to the next as circumstances
change. That is, the question remains whether rent extraction can explain
any aspects of current executive compensation practices and the direction in
which these practices are headed.

III.

THE COMPENSATION LANDSCAPE AS SEEN BY THE TWO VIEWS

We now turn to consider, in light of the alternative views of executive
compensation that the preceding Part has outlined, the vast empirical
evidence on the subject. We start the examination in this Part by discussing
those features of the evidence that are consistent with both models. We
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describe how some basic features of compensation practices are viewed by
each of the two perspectives. In Part IV, we will discuss evidence that can be
better explained by the rent extraction view and thus suggests the presence
of rent extraction.
A. The Use of Executive Stock Options
During the 1980s and 1990s, executive stock options became an
increasingly important element of corporate compensation schemes,
overtaking base salary as the largest single component of most executive pay
packages.102 The increasing use of options has been a primary factor driving
the ten-fold increase in CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity over the last
two decades. One study of 1994 data from Forbes 500 firms determined that
CEO salary and bonus were not significantly responsive to firm
performance, while CEO stock and options holdings contributed roughly
equally to pay-for-performance sensitivity.103 A more recent analysis found
that annual cash compensation and long term performance plan payouts
contributed as little as 2% to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in
shareholder value, while options contributed 46% and stock holdings

Murphy reports that option grants in manufacturing firms increased from
27% to 36% of total compensation between 1992 and 1996 alone. See Murphy, supra
note 3. Yermack finds that on average options awards accounted for 20% of CEO
compensation in 1984, 35% in 1990, and 30% in 1991. See David Yermack, Do
Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1995).
Updating Yermack’s data, Hall and Liebman report that 70% of Forbes 500 CEO’s
received stock options in 1994, up from 30% in 1980, and that the mean value of
options awarded to these CEO’s increased from $155,000 to $1.2 million over this
period. See Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEO’s Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998). All of these studies utilized the BlackScholes methodology to value the option grants. Taking a different approach in a
recent survey, the IRRC determined that the median S&P 500 CEO received options
worth $8.4 million in 1998 based on an assumption of 10% appreciation in the stock
price prior to exercise. See Kathy B. Ruxton, EXECUTIVE PAY, 1997 : CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER COMPENSATION AT S&P SUPER 1,500 COMPANIES AS REPORTED IN 1997
(Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1998). For a discussion of the dilution
caused by the use of stock options and the cost to shareholders, see Jennifer N.
Carpenter and David L. Yermack, Dilution from Stock-Based Compensation (working
paper, 2000).
103 See Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation 22, NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000) (employing 1994 data and
finding that an improvement from median to 70th percentile firm performance
would increase the options-related wealth of the median Forbes 500 CEO by $0.85
million and stock plus options-related wealth by $1.8 million).
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contributed 51%.104 This trend appears responsive to the long-standing
demand of management experts and shareholder activists for a shift away
from fixed compensation to performance-responsive pay practices.105
The dramatic increase in the use of options in executive pay can be
seen as the widespread adoption of a new compensation “technology.” There
is no question that this technology, if implemented properly, can improve
managers’ incentives and increase shareholder wealth. The issue is whether
firms apply this technology in a manner optimal for shareholders.
1. Using Options as Part of Optimal Contracting
Proponents of optimal contracting generally see the increasing use of
options as an unambiguously positive development.
The optimal
contracting school sees this compensation technology as good not only in
principle but also in the way it has been applied. In their view these option
plans provide increased market-based incentives for executives and bring
total compensation packages closely in line with the optimal arrangement.106

See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (working paper, 1997). Slicing
the data somewhat differently, Murphy finds that options and restricted stock
accounts for 64% of the median 1996 pay-for-performance sensitivity among CEO’s
of S&P 500 manufacturing firms, while stock holdings accounts for 31%. See
Murphy, supra note 3, at 83. See also John E. Core, et al., Are Performance Measures
Other Than Price Important to CEO Incentives? (working paper, 2000) (finding that
stock returns explain more than 90% of the total variation in CEO firm specific
wealth).
105 Insensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance reportedly
was one criteria employed by T. Boone Pickens’ United Shareholders of America in
its 1986-1993 campaign to improve corporate governance. See Deon Strickland et
al., A Requiem for the USA: Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 J. FIN. &
ECON. 319 (1996).
106 There is an extensive literature on the design of optimal compensation
arrangements and related issues. See Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification and
Incentives (working paper, 2000); Frank Moers and Erik Peek, Managerial Risk
Aversion and Executive Compensation: Measurement Issues and an Empirical Test
(working paper, 2000) (developing and empirically testing proxies for managerial
risk aversion); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive Compensation, Managerial Risk
Aversion, and the Choice of Risky Projects (working paper, 2000); Tom Nohel and
Steven Todd, Executive Compensation, Reputation, and Risk-Taking Incentives, (working
paper, 2001); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Optimal Compensation for Risk-Averse
Executives with Career Concerns (working paper, 2001); Yisong S. Tian, Optimal
Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options (working
paper, 2001).
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2. Using Options to Extract Rent
One adhering to the rent extraction view would not question that
granting some options, by providing managers with more incentive to create
shareholder value, might well be beneficial to shareholders.107 Rather, such a
person would question whether the magnitude and design of a particular
option-based pay package is optimal for shareholders.108 In other words, the
issue is not the desirability of options in general, but how much should be
given to executives and how these options should be structured. Although
the introduction of options might well be a beneficial innovation that has
yielded a useful incentive instrument, this innovation may also have
increased executives’ ability to camouflage rent and, as a result, their ability
to extract more rents. On the rent extraction view, executives may have used
the options bandwagon to extract rent.
And a major bandwagon it was: The 1990s boom in overall executive
pay tracked the stock option boom. It is possible the widespread adoption of
executive stock options has enabled executives to justify taking significantly
larger amounts of value. One suspects the commentators and investors who
advocated tying executive pay to performance envisioned shifting dollars
out of straight salary and unresponsive bonus plans and into option or
restricted stock plans. Average salary and bonus amounts have continued to
rise, however, even as option awards have mushroomed. According to one
study, from 1992 to 1998 the salary of the median S&P 500 CEO increased by
29% to $811,000 and the median bonus increased by 99% to $750,000, while
the median value of options grants rose by 335% to $1.6 million.109 By

It is worth noting that an option grant can provide desirable incentives
for managers only to the extent that managers who already own shares do not react
to the option grant by selling a corresponding number of their existing shares. To
the extent that managers offset the option grant with sales of existing stock, the
option grant does not affect managers’ incentives. See John Core and Wayne Guay,
When Contracts Require Risk-Averse Executives to Hold Equity: Implications for Option
Valuation and Relative Performance Valuation (working paper, 2001).
108 For theoretical analyses suggesting that an optimal compensation package
should consist of only a relatively small amount of options, see Tom Nohel and
Steven Todd, Optimal Compensation for Risk-Averse Executives with Career Concerns
(working paper, 2001); Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive Compensation,
Reputation, and Risk-Taking Incentives (working paper, 2001).
109 See Perry and Zenner, supra note 1. The option figures provided are based
on an ex ante determination of grant date value based on a modified Black-Scholes
methodology. See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (working paper, 1997).
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comparison, during this period the seasonally adjusted civilian employment
cost index increased by 20% and the CPI increased by 16%.110
According to these figures, median total CEO compensation increased
by about 160% over this six-year period.111 It is conceivable that further
increases in salary, bonus, and more traditional long-term incentive plans
would have yielded a comparable increase in overall compensation in the
absence of the options boom, but we are skeptical. Had option grants
remained small and infrequent, salary, bonus, or long-term incentive plan
payouts would have needed to increase much more rapidly to generate the
same overall compensation boost.112 Using these numbers and holding
option grant value steady at the 1992 figure, over $1 million in added cash
compensation would have been needed to achieve the same median overall
compensation. We suspect that added cash compensation of this magnitude
would have been much more salient and would have met with fierce
resistance from investors, the media, and perhaps Congress.113
Of course large options grants have sparked public outcry as well, but
we suspect for several reasons that the reaction to options has been more
subdued than the reaction to cash would have been. Options enable rent
extraction to be camouflaged for several reasons. First, options do provide
executives with some useful incentives, and the value of these incentives is
hard to estimate. Thus, even if the pay resulting from options appears
inordinate, there would always be a facially plausible argument that the
options serve shareholders’ interests, whereas this would not be the case
with a huge cash payment. Second, the value of stock options to the
recipients is difficult to estimate; even finance experts sometimes disagree on
the proper valuation methodology.114 Third, the media tend to focus on the
See Perry and Zenner, supra note 1, for the employment cost index figure.
The CPI figure is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database.
111 See id.
112 Were compensation bargaining arm’s length, of course, we would not
expect a dollar of options value to replace a dollar of salary because options
represent risky compensation to the executive.
113 In 1993 Congress restricted corporations from deducting nonperformance-based compensation in excess of $1 million paid to the CEO and the
top four other mostly highly compensated executives. See IRC § 162(m).
114 See Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock
Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1998); Murphy, supra note 3; Steven Huddart and
Mark Lang, Employee Stock Options Exercises: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. ACCT.
ECON. 5 (1996); Robert A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive
Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 129 (1991). When the experts failed to agree on
a valuation methodology, the predecessor to the FASB yielded and decided that
standard executive stock options would not necessitate a charge to earnings. See
GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991). Meulbroek finds a large difference
between the cost of stock options to a firm’s shareholders (their market value) and
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gains reaped by executives on the exercise of options (the clearer figure)
rather than on the value of the grants. This has enabled some executives to
amass considerable paper wealth with little outcry.115 Fourth, compensation
via options is paid out through stock dilution rather than cash. Fifth, while
the FASB has required the disclosure of options grants to top executives, it
has not required that the cost of most of these grants be taken into account
for corporate earnings purposes.116 We shall discuss some of these features
of option plan design in detail in Part IV.
3. Possible Objections to the Rent Extraction View of Options
Although the empirical evidence on the use of options is consistent
with both the optimal contracting view and the rent extraction view, one
might nevertheless find the optimal contracting view more appealing
because (1) the increase in use of options coincided with the spectacular
performance of the U.S. stock market over the last decade and (2) higher
the value of options to the often undiversified executives who receive them. She
finds that undiversified executives of internet companies would value options at an
average of only 53% of their cost to the company. Typical undiversified executives
of NYSE companies, on the other hand, would value options at about 70% of
shareholder cost. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:
Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (working paper,
2000).
115 In a recent survey the IRRC reported that the median S&P 500 CEO held
unexercised in-the-money options worth $10.9 million in 1998 and that two-thirds of
these options were vested. In 1997 the median CEO had held unexercised options
worth $5.6 million. See KATHY B. RUXTON, EXECUTIVE PAY, 1997: CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER COMPENSATION AT S&P SUPER 1,500 COMPANIES AS REPORTED IN 1997
(Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1998).
116 We certainly are not the first observers to see the possibility of rent
extraction in executive stock options programs. For example, Hall and Liebman
suggest that the increase in options may result from a board’s desire to pay CEO’s
more, but in a less visible fashion. They focus on the lack of an accounting charge.
See Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation 22,
NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000). Similarly, Lazear notes the perception that
options are less apparent to shareholders than other forms of compensation. See
Edward P. Lazear, Output-based Pay: Incentives or Sorting (working paper, 1999).
Leonard suggests that misinformation may play a role in the adoption of option
plans since the accounting rules do not value options correctly and payment is
made via share dilution. See Jonathan S. Leonard, Executive Pay and Firm
Performance, 43 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 13 (1990). See also Tom Nohel and S.
Todd, Executive Compensation, Managerial Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Risky
Projects (Feb. 2000) (suggesting that options may transfer wealth from stockholders
to entrenched executives).
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equity ownership by managers is generally associated with better firm
performance. As we explain below, however, these two observations are not
at all inconsistent with the rent extraction explanation for the use of options.
(i) The Success of the U.S. Stock Market. As will be discussed later,
options are more heavily used in executive pay in the U.S. than in other
countries. Adherents to the optimal-contracting view might point to the
outstanding performance of U.S. stocks over the past decade117 as evidence
that the executive stock option boom has been a very good thing for
shareholders. Such an inference would not be valid, however. It is difficult
to establish a causal connection between the increasing use of executive stock
options and steeply increasing price-to-earnings ratios given the many far
more important factors that affect the overall level of U.S. stock prices.
Inferring that U.S. corporate governance is superior on the basis of U.S. stock
market performance over the past decade is no more valid than reaching the
same inference with respect to Japanese and German governance structures
based on the performance of those economies during the preceding decade.
If such inferences cannot be drawn for corporate governance in general,
surely they cannot be drawn with respect to the particular feature of the use
of options.
(ii) Evidence that Equity Ownership by Managers Benefits Shareholders.
There is considerable (although contested) evidence that equity ownership
by managers of publicly traded firms with dispersed ownership increases
firm performance.118 However, even if equity ownership by managers
improves firm performance, studies linking managerial equity ownership to
stock performance are actually of only limited relevance to the question of
whether rent extraction can explain the use of option compensation.
First, the methodology of most of these studies measures the benefits
of giving equity to managers but not the costs. The general approach of
these studies is to examine managers’ shareholdings at a particular point in
time and then measure firm performance going forward. Such a study might
find that the shares of firms whose managers own more equity (as a
percentage of outstanding shares) outperform the shares of firms whose
managers own less equity. However, if the shares had been provided as
117

The S&P 500 index increased by 220% between 1992 and 1998, but of
course corporate earnings have not kept pace. See Perry and Zenner, supra note 1.
118 See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Management
Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 293-315
(1988); John McConnell and Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership
and Corporate Value, 27 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 595-612 (1990). But see
Claudio Loderer and Kenneth Martin, Executive Stock Ownership and Performance:
Tracking Faint Traces, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1997) (finding no evidence based on a
study of 1978 through 1988 data that greater stock ownership by executives
improves firm performance but rather that firm performance affects how much
stock the executives hold).
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compensation, they would have been provided by the firm before the
measurement period had begun. Thus, the studies do not measure the cost
of giving the managers those shares in the first instance. As a result, even if
higher managerial equity ownership is associated with better firm
performance, one cannot conclude from these studies that the benefit of
giving additional equity to managers exceeds the cost to shareholders.
Second, the effect of managers’ stock ownership on firm value is likely
different than the effect of managers’ option holdings on firm value. As is
well understood, options and stock do not create the same effort and project
choice incentives because there are different payoffs associated with each
instrument.119 Thus, even if studies on the effect of managerial equity
holdings on shareholder wealth took into account the cost of providing
managers with that equity, these studies would still be of only limited
relevance for answering the question of whether the use of options increases
shareholder value.
In fact, the few studies focusing on the effect of options on
shareholder value fail to demonstrate that adoption of option programs
increases shareholder value. If anything, they suggest the opposite. One
analysis of companies that adopted executive stock option plans between
1978 and 1982 determined that cumulative abnormal returns declined
subsequently for two-thirds of the sample, that ROA declined absolutely and
adjusted for industry, that R&D expenditure decreased, and that perquisite
consumption increased.120 A more recent study examining publicly traded
U.S. firms between 1992-1997 finds that CEO’s hold too many options and
shareholder value would increase if the number of options held by CEO’s
were reduced.121 Thus, the empirical data that is most relevant suggests that
the use of option programs is consistent with rent extraction.
See, e.g., Dirk C. Jenter, Understanding High-Powered Incentives, (working
paper, 2001).
120 See Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Association Between Executive Stock
Option Plan Changes and Managerial Decision Making, 20 FIN. MGMT. 36 (1991).
121 Michel A. Habib and Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Firm Value and Managerial
Incentives (working paper, 2000). Although this paper and the DeFusco et al study,
supra note ___, are the only two studies we have found that examine the effect of
options programs on shareholder value, there have been a number of other studies
that find that the use of options increase stock price and cash flow volatility. See,
e.g., Richard A. DeFusco, R. Johnson, and T. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock Option
Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617 (1990). The authors also found
that options induce a transfer of wealth from bondholders to stockholders.
Although such a transfer might benefit shareholders ex post, ex ante shareholders
must pay for this transfer in the form of higher interest rates. For other studies
showing that option-based pay causes managers to choose increase the volatility of
cash flows and/or stock prices, see A. Agrawal and G. Mandelker, Managerial
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J. FIN. 823 (1987);
Shivaram Rajgopal and Terry Shevlin, Early Evidence on the Informativeness of the
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(iii) The Devil is in the Details. It is important to emphasize that even if
the use of options was found to be partially responsible for the excellent
performance of the U.S. stock market during the last decade and that the
adoption of an options program was found to boost a firm’s stock price, one
still could not rule out the role of rent extraction in the use of option
compensation. The rent extraction view does not assert that the option
programs adopted by publicly traded companies reduce share prices and
make shareholders worse off. As we have just noted, the key issue is not
whether options are a desirable innovation. It is how many options are given
to executives and how those options are structured. Even if one were to
accept that the use of options in general is beneficial to shareholders, many
particular choices are made in the design of an option plan that may not be
beneficial. Thus the key question is the design of the plans. We will focus on
this critical question in Part IV, where we argue that many of the most
prominent features of option grants – the use of non-indexed options, at-themoney strike prices, and reloads – are better explained by the rent extraction
view, indicating that rent extraction plays a role in the design of option plans
and practices.
B. The Use of Compensation Consultants
1. Using Consultants to Search for Optimal Arrangements
U.S. public companies typically employ outside consultants to
provide input into the executive compensation process. 122 Their use can be
explained within the optimal-contracting framework.
Compensation
consultants may contribute to improving executive pay practices in two
ways. First, they contribute expertise on the design of compensation
packages. Second, they conduct compensation surveys and provide access to
industry pay data that would not be shared directly between companies.123
This data, in turn, might be used to improve compensation packages.124

SEC's Market Risk Disclosures: The Case of Commodity Price Risk Exposure of Oil and Gas
Producers, 74 ACCOUNTING REVIEW 251 (1999); C. Schrand and H. Unal, Hedging and
Coordinated Risk Management: Evidence from Thrift Conversions, 53 J.FIN. 979 (1998);
Peter A. Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management
Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097 (1996).
122 See John M. Bizjack, Michael L. Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen, Has the Use
of Peer Groups Contributed to Higher Levels of Executive Compensation? (working paper,
2000) (reporting that at least 65% of firms use compensation consultants).
123 This data is provided in summary form only, of course. Firms participate
in compensation surveys with the understanding that individual firm data will be
kept confidential by the consultant. It is widely understood that compensation
surveys have been responsible for the high degree of correlation between CEO pay
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2. Using Consultants to Legitimize Compensation Arrangements
The process through which pay consultants are retained and some
evidence regarding their use, however, suggest an alternative explanation for
the employment of these consultants that is in line with the rent extraction
model: Managers might use compensation consultants primarily to justify
executive pay, rather than to optimize it. As is the case with management
domination over the board of directors, as we have discussed above, there is
at least a risk of compensation consultant capture by management.
Typically, compensation consultants are hired through a company’s human
resources department, and anecdotal evidence suggests that some CEO’s are
heavily involved in the process.125 Moreover, executive pay consultants
often work for consulting firms that have other, larger assignments with the
hiring company. This tends to undermine their objectivity.126
Through the use of surveys, pay consultants generate a mass of
comparative compensation data that can be used to justify “objectively” a
pay plan. Naturally, however, the output of this process depends in large
part on survey design. One commentator argues that managers structure
consulting assignments to focus attention on the compensation elements that
will shed the most favorable light on executive pay and guide the selection of
the peer group to accomplish the same end, and that compensation
consultants go along with management’s self-serving choices.127
Wade, Porac, and Pollack provide some evidence that companies use
pay consultants and surveys strategically in justifying executive
compensation. They find that companies that pay their CEO's larger base
salaries and firms with more concentrated and active outside ownership are
more likely to cite the use of surveys and consultants in justifying executive
pay to the shareholders.128 The authors’ other findings, for example, that
accounting returns are stressed when they are high and that market returns
and company size. See George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs.
Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593 (1988).
124 As explained earlier, however, members of the compensation committee
might feel pressure to conform to the pay practices at similar firms, regardless of
their own view as to the desirability of those practices.
125 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991).
At least one
institutional investor – TIAA/CREF – has suggested that compensation committees
should be prepared to hire their own, independent executive pay consultants. See
Fund Toughens on Executive Pay, INVESTOR RELATIONS BUS., Apr. 3, 2000.
126 See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991) (suggesting that
employee benefits and other assignments often produce more revenue for a
consulting firm than the executive compensation consulting assignment).
127 See id.
128 See James B. Wade et al., Worth, Words, and the Justification of Executive Pay,
18 J. ORG. BEHAVIOR 641 (1997).

47

are de-emphasized when they are volatile,129 also are consistent with a view
that executives, through the compensation committee, are working to throw
the best possible light on their compensation. This lends further support to
the notion that consultants and surveys are employed for the same purpose.
C. The Limited Fraction of Value Paid to Executives
Even with generous stock option plans, executives capture only a
limited fraction of any increase in firm value. In an influential 1990 article,130
Jensen and Murphy reported finding a statistically significant relationship
between CEO pay and firm performance, but they argued that the fraction of
increase in company value retained by CEO’s was too small to be consistent
with optimal contracting. The authors suggested that political constraints
might account for the gap. Other commentators have argued that the
sensitivity of pay-for-performance found by Jensen and Murphy can be
reconciled with optimal contracting. In any event, more recent data indicate
that the fraction of value retained by executives has increased dramatically
over the last two decades. We conclude that the pay-for-performance
sensitivity data are not inconsistent with either model of executive
compensation.
1. Claims that Executives Receive Too Small a Fraction of Value
Using 1974 through 1986 data, Jensen and Murphy calculated that the
median CEO of some 1300 companies included in Forbes’ Executive
Compensation Survey experienced a change in wealth of $3.25 for each $1000
change in shareholder value.131 Although they found that the relationship
between pay and performance was statistically significant, Jensen and
Murphy concluded that the incentives provided were insufficient to restrain
executives from consuming excessive perquisites and generally maximizing
their own utility at the expense of the shareholders.132 The authors
See id.
See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).
131
See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). The $3.25 figure includes a $0.30
adjustment for the increased risk of dismissal associated with a $1000 drop in share
value. See also Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How
Much, But How, HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990).
132 See Michael Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). Jensen and Murphy determined
that CEO incentives had deteriorated between the 1930s and 1980s in part because
of a reduction in pay-for-performance sensitivity but primarily as a result of a
reduction in the fraction of company shares held by CEO’s. See also Michael Jensen
129
130
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speculated that political pressures prevent firms from adopting highly
performance-responsive pay schemes that would result in high
compensation for the very top performers.133 As a result, in the view of
Jensen and Murphy, the financial rewards that executives receive in case of
success are lower than would be optimal for shareholders.
2. Defense of Existing Levels by Supporters of Optimal Contracting
Several commentators writing from the optimal contracting
perspective have disagreed with Jensen and Murphy’s assessment of the
performance sensitivity data.134 Hall and Liebman have argued that the
$3.25 figure is significant because the total wealth of a CEO of a large
company will be quite sensitive to changes in firm value.135 Baker and Hall
later refined this argument, explaining that the adequacy of the incentive
depends on the class of decision at hand.136 When considering perquisite
consumption, an executive simply will take into account the cost of the perk

and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much, But How, HARV. BUS. REV.
138 (1990). But see Charles J. Hadlock and Gerald B. Lumar, Compensation, Turnover,
and Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence, 70 J. BUS. 153 (1997) (arguing that
executive incentives under the control of the board of directors actually improved
over the period in question).
133 See id.
Although they concluded that executive pay-for-performance
sensitivity was sub-optimal, Jensen and Murphy approached this problem from the
optimal contracting perspective. They suggested that the optimal contract would
arise between parties but for political constraints on the amount high-level
performers could be paid. Cf. Paul Joskow et al., Political Constraints on Executive
Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry, RAND J. ECON. 165 (1996)
(presenting evidence that political pressure constrains CEO pay in the electric utility
industry).
134 In addition to the papers that are discussed in the text, see Joseph G.
Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 258, 258-276 (1994) (arguing that median pay-for-performance sensitivity
observed by Jensen and Murphy is reconcilable with principal-agency theory given
reasonable estimates of CEO risk aversion and other parameters). See also Bengt
Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses, Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991)
(suggesting that fixed pay can be optimal in situations where multiple tasks are
required of an agent, particularly when measuring performance in various activities
is difficult).
135 See Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000).
136 See George P. Baker and Brian J. Hall, CEO Incentives and Firm Size
(working paper, 1998).
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and the percent of the firm he “owns.”137 Some decisions, however, such as
the choice of resisting or supporting a takeover attempt, tend to have an
effect that varies with firm size. With regard to these decisions, Baker and
Hall argued, the value of the CEO’s total equity stake will come into play,
and large firm CEO’s will be less likely to deviate from shareholder
optimality.138
Other work demonstrates that the executive stock option boom of the
last two decades has led to a dramatic increase in the sensitivity of executive
wealth to company performance. One study found that in 1997 the median
S&P 1500 CEO stood to gain or lose $11.50 for each $1000 gain or loss in
shareholder value.139 A more recent analysis, estimates average CEO wealthto-shareholder value sensitivity of approximately $11 per $1000, assuming a
firm with a market capitalization of $1 billion.140 Taken altogether, the payfor-performance data that have been generated might be consistent with the
optimal contracting model, perhaps with some adjustment for political
constraints.
See id. Here “percent owned” is used as shorthand for the measure of
wealth to performance sensitivity, which can arise from shares owned, options held,
or other performance related pay schemes. Using Jensen and Murphy’s figures by
way of example, the median CEO would weigh a $325 personal cost in considering
a $100,000 perquisite expenditure.
138 See id. Consider, for example, the decision to support or resist a takeover
at a 50% premium. The personal payoff to a CEO with 1% of a $10 billion company
obviously is ten times that of a CEO with 1% of a $1 billion company. The cost to
the displaced CEO due to loss of job, prestige, and pay also is greater in the first
instance, but it probably is not an order of magnitude greater. See Murphy, supra
note 3 (historically CEO pay increased 3% for a 10% increase in sales).
139 See Tod Perry and Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government
Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (working paper, 1997).
140 See Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive
Compensation NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000). This estimate and that provided
by Perry and Zenner exclude adjustment for risk of dismissal. See Tod Perry and
Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of
Compensation Contracts (working paper, 1997). See also Paul L. Joskow and Nancy L.
Rose, CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative
Performance Measures (working paper, 1994) (examining CEO pay from 1970 through
1990 and finding CEO compensation to be more sensitive to performance in the
1980s); Malcolm Baker and Paul A. Gompers, An Analysis of Executive Compensation,
Ownership, and Control in Closely Held Firms (working paper, 1999) (finding that the
sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder value among CEO’s of firms undertaking
IPO's is 50 times greater than that found by Jensen and Murphy). Comparing IPO
firms with a broad sample of mature and new firms is a bit of an apples and oranges
exercise. It would be interesting, however, to compare pay-for-performance
sensitivity between size- and perhaps industry-matched samples of mature and IPO
firms.
137
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3. The Rent Extraction Perspective
The pay for performance data, however, also appears to be consistent
with the rent extraction view. It is impossible to determine the optimal payfor-performance sensitivity, and thus we cannot say whether option grants
generally are sufficient today, nor can we dismiss the possibility that reduced
grants might enhance shareholder value.141 Few incentives may be necessary
to induce executive effort, and the form, rather than the amount, of
incentives provided may be more important for inducing optimal effort and
decision-making.
Second, and more important, even if executive pay is too insensitive to
performance, we need not conclude that overall pay is too low and should be
increased to raise pay-performance sensitivity. It might be the case that the
overall level of executive pay could be reduced with either no effect or a
positive effect on sensitivity by restructuring the form of compensation. We
will discuss below how this could be done and why, because of rent
extraction and camouflage, it might not be done.

IV. EVIDENCE BETTER EXPLAINED BY RENT EXTRACTION
This Part discusses important elements of the empirical evidence that
better support the rent extraction view. We consider various compensation
practices and patterns that are difficult to explain within the optimal
contracting framework. Some of these practices and patterns have long
puzzled researchers holding the optimal contracting view; we have
identified others as posing problems for this view. Each of these practices
and patterns, we believe, can be better explained by the rent extraction
model, suggesting that rent extraction might be a significant phenomenon.
In the aggregate, we suggest, these practices and patterns provide a solid
basis for concluding that rent extraction is likely to play a significant role in
the executive compensation process.
A. Rewarding Executives for General Market Rises
Although some firms include relative performance measures in their
bonus programs,142 almost no companies include adjustments for industry or
As Murphy has noted, there is little direct evidence that increased payfor-performance sensitivity results in increased stock prices. See Murphy, supra note
3. We will return to this point below.
141

See Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts, 30 J.
ACCOUNTING AND ECON. 245 (2001) (finding that only 21% of S&P 500 industrial
142
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market returns in the design of executive stock options, which, as we have
noted, now represent the largest single component of the average executive’s
compensation package.143 Accordingly, an executive is rewarded for absolute
share price increases, even if those increases are purely a function of broad
market or sector increases. Thus, the executive might get a large payment
from exercising his options and selling the stock regardless of the executive’s
contribution to the share price increase. Indeed, during the 1990s stock
market boom, an executive might have made a large amount of money even
if her firm’s performance was worse than that of every other peer firm.
firms incorporated relative performance evaluation (RPE) in their 1997 bonus plans,
while 57% of financial firms and 42% of utilities did so); Rick Antle and Abbie
Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate
Executives, 24 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 1 (1986) (examining the total after-tax
compensation received by the three highest-paid executives in 39 firms over the
period 1947-1977 and finding some evidence that the compensation is tied to
relative performance of the firm); Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy, Relative
Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers, 43 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 30
(1990)(examining the compensation of 1668 CEO’s from 1049 firms from 1974 to
1986 and finding some evidence the compensation is tied to relative performance).
But see Surya N. Janakiraman et al., An Empirical Investigation of the Relative
Performance Evaluation Hypothesis, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 53 (1992) (examining CEO
cash compensation from 609 firms from 1970 to 1988 and finding little evidence that
RPE is used in determining such compensation); John E. Garen, Executive
Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1175 (1994) (examining
the compensation of 415 CEO’s in 1988 and concluding that there is little evidence
of use of relative performance pay); Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick,
The Other Side of The Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation, 107 J. POL.
ECON. 65 (1999)(finding no evidence of RPE in compensation in study of executive
salaries during the period 1993-1996). Cf. Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G.
Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for CEO’s: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance
Sensitivity (working paper, 1999) (arguing that the apparent absence of RPE is due
to the inelastic supply of CEO’s able to manage large enterprises, which causes CEO
pay to increase with aggregate positive shocks to the market). There is some
evidence that even though compensation is not based on RPE, relative performance
is a better predictor of CEO firing than absolute stock price performance. See Jerold
B. Warner et al, Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 461
(1988)(finding that in 269 publicly-traded US firms followed from 1962 to 1978,
relative share performance was a better predictor of management turnover than
absolute share performance).
143 See Murphy, supra note 3 (only one out of 1000 large public companies
examined indexed the exercise price of options to market or peer performance);
Joann S. Lublin, Pay for Outperforming, James Crowe, Chief of Level 3 Communications,
Makes the Case for Linking Stock Options to Market-Beating Gains, WALL ST. J., April 6,
2000, at R8 (reporting on Level 3 Communication’s use of S&P 500 indexed options
and noting that “[t]oday, no other public corporation takes such a daring approach
to equity compensation”).
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Compensation dollars could be much better spent if executives
received these dollars only to the extent that the increase in their firm’s share
price was due to firm-specific performance, and not sector- or broadermarket performance. There have been a number of proposals for such
relative pay schemes. For example, as Alfred Rappaport has recently
proposed in the Harvard Business Review,144 stock options should be
designed with an exercise price that rises or falls with broader market
movements. Alternatively, the exercise price of an option could be tied to the
price of a basket of stocks in the firm’s own industry. This would tie an
executive’s reward more closely to firm-specific performance that is within
his control.145
Yet firms almost never employ options whose exercise price is
somehow indexed to the performance of other firms in the industry or the
market as a whole. Optimal contracting theorists have tried to explain the
failure of companies to employ such indexed options but, as we will see,
their efforts have not been very successful. This has led some prominent
researchers in the field of executive compensation to declare that “the near
complete absence of relative pay seems to be a puzzle.”146 As we will show,
however, this failure can be explained under the rent extraction view.
1. The Benefits of (some form of) Indexing
The optimal principal-agent contract should compensate the agent
based on the achievement of objectives within the scope of his control. Since
managerial effort essentially is unobservable and accounting results are
noisy and fail to reflect the current value of growth opportunities, the share
price of a firm provides a useful tool for evaluating executive performance.
However, compensation that is based on absolute share price
performance rewards managers even when the managers’ efforts have not
contributed to the share price increase. In particular, the share price increase
might be driven solely by factors external to the firm – such as changes in the
economy that benefit the firm’s industry or interest rate cuts that benefit the
market as a whole. Because of such external factors, even managers who
perform poorly -- and whose actions therefore stunt the increase in the price

See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with
Performance, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr.1999, 91-101.
145 See, e.g., Shane Johnson and Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects
of Non-Traditional Executive Stock Option Plans, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000)(arguing that
per dollar value indexed options create more powerful incentives than traditional
options).
146
See Brian J. Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEO’s Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998).
144
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of the firm’s stock -- can profit when their compensation is linked to changes
in the absolute share price.
To be sure, the managers will be penalized if they add value but the
stock price nevertheless declines because of changes beyond their control in
the economy or the firm’s sector. But such negative shocks are unlikely to
take from managers as much as positive shocks will give them. First, while
the economy and demand for the firm’s products can contract as well as
expand, over time it is reasonable to expect that these effects will be, on
average, positive. Second, managers can never lose money from holding an
option. The lowest payoff is 0%. Thus negative economy- and industryshocks can never take away from the manager more than the firm specific
value that he creates. For these two reasons, on an expected value basis the
contribution of external market and sector forces to the value of the option is
always positive.
From shareholders’ perspective, the options plan should be designed
to maximize incentives given the amount of dollars spent or to achieve a
certain amount of incentive at the lowest possible cost. When managers are
rewarded for market- and sector-wide price movements that have nothing to
do with their efforts, the money is wasted. This raises the possibilities that
the firm could either create the same incentive for less money or use the
same amount of money to create even more powerful incentives.
The latter possibility is worth spelling out. If the firm gives the
managers 1000 options to buy stock at the current market price of $100, some
of the expected value of the options -- and therefore some of the expected
cost of the options to other shareholders -- comes from the fact that the stock
price might increase for reasons having nothing to do with the managers’
efforts but rather, say, because of unexpected reductions in interest rates. To
the extent industry and market-wide effects boost the stock price, the
manager will be “rewarded” for these increases when he exercises the
options and shareholders will pay for this reward, even though this reward
has no effect on the manager’s incentives.
If we could design the scheme to remove or reduce the undeserved
reward component of the option’s value, we could at the same cost give the
manager a larger number of differently structured options which would
provide better incentives by linking the payoff more closely to the manager’s
efforts. Thus, significant benefits could be obtained from schemes that
remove some or all of the reward to managers that has nothing to do with
the manager’s contribution to the stock price.
One approach that has received a great deal of support from
academics and other commentators is that of “indexing” the exercise price of
the option to the performance of the sector or the market as a whole to try to
filter out changes in the stock price that are not due to the manager’s efforts.
Because the option could not be used to capture the expected increase in the
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stock price due to non-firm-specific effects, its expected value -- and its
expected cost to shareholders -- would be lower.
By giving managers options that reward such managers only for
increases in price that are firm-specific and thus more likely to result from
their own efforts, a firm could, at the same cost, give more options to the
managers and thereby increase their reward for creating value themselves.
This, in turn, should induce more effort. Returning to our example, one
might be able to give -- at the same cost as 1000 regular options -- 1500
options whose strike price is $100 (the current market price) multiplied by,
say, a market index. Under such a scheme, if the market has risen 30% since
the options were granted, the exercise price would be $100 x (1.30) or $130.
Using such a scheme would have the same cost to the firm but would
provide stronger incentives. The index of course need not be the market – it
could be the average performance of firms in the same industry. Using such
an index would screen out not only broad market effects, but also effects
associated with the firm’s industry.
We should emphasize that standard indexing (either to the market or
to a basket of peer firms) is not the only possibility. Suppose, for example,
that one opposes indexing options to the average performance of peer firms
because one believes that there are problems specific to the firm that are not
of the CEO’s doing which will limit the firm’s performance in the short run.
Or suppose the firm has no such problems but one is concerned that the CEO
will have insufficient incentive to generate value if, in the middle of the
vesting period, the CEO finds his firm ranked at the bottom of the industry
and believes there is little he can do to bring the options into the money.
Someone with these concerns could adopt a more “moderate” form of
indexing where the exercise price is indexed not by the average performance
of the industry (or the wider market) but by a certain fraction of it.
Alternatively, one could tie the exercise price to the performance of the
companies in, say, the bottom 25th percentile of the industry.147
Note that such full or partial indexing may lead to the exercise price
being lower than the market price at the time the options are granted. This
would occur if the market or the industry (as the case may be) suffers a
negative shock between the time the options are granted and when they are
exercised. Whether the reduction in the exercise price gives managers more
than they would have received under a regular options scheme would
depend on whether those regular options would have been repriced. As we
147

There are other approaches to screening out effects that are beyond the
manager’s control. See, e.g., Lisa K. Meulbroek, Executive Compensation Using
Relative-Performance-Based Options: Evaluating the Structure and Costs of Indexed
Options (working paper, 2001)(contending that an option whose exercise price is
tied to a market or industry index does not completely filter out market or industry
effects, and offering an alternative mechanism designed to do so).
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will see, such repricing is not uncommon. If the regular options would not
have not been repriced, then the indexed options would make the managers
better off. If the regular options would have been repriced to the indexed
price or even lower, indexing would not make the managers better off. But
even if the regular options would not have been repriced, because on
average market and industry shocks are likely to be positive, the extra
amount received when the index falls is unlikely to be as much as is taken
away when the index rises.
Of course, one might want the exercise price to never fall below the
market price at the time of issuance. In such a case, one could still take into
account relative performance, but only on the upside. This could be done by
using an exercise price that is the greater of the market price when the option
is issued and the index-adjusted price. Any index could be used. Therefore
one could tie the exercise price to the performance of the broader market, the
industry, or some other set of firms, using average performance or any other
metric, such as percentiles. The only situation in which this semi-indexed
scheme would yield different results than regular options is when the index
is in positive territory. In such cases, the payouts would be lower. However,
by employing the semi-indexed scheme, the firm could use the expected
savings from not rewarding the manager for changes beyond his control
could be used to increase the number of options given at the grant-date and
therefore boost performance incentives.
We want to stress that it is not our intention here to resolve the
question of exactly how relative performance should be incorporated into
option design. The optimal design may vary from industry to industry and
perhaps even from firm to firm. We just want to point out that there is every
reason to think that such schemes could generate better incentives for the
same cost. 148

There are other possible benefits to indexing that we have not touched on.
For example, it is well understood that indexing the exercise price of options could
eliminate an element of market uncertainty that creates risk for the executive who
holds non-indexed options. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL. J.
ECON. 324 (1982); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL. J.
ECON. 74 (1979) (arguing that even imperfect information can be used to improve
upon a contract when effort is unobservable). But see Li Jin, CEO Compensation,
Diversification and Incentives (working paper, 2000)(observing that indexing shifts
market risk back to shareholders who might also be risk averse, and thus that from
a pure risk-sharing -- i.e., non-incentive -- perspective the optimal contract might
not involve indexing); John Core and Wayne Guay, When Contracts Require RiskAverse Executives to Hold Equity: Implications for Option Valuation and Relative
Performance Valuation (working paper, 2001)(observing to the extent that a firm
requires managers to invest in firm shares rather than use the funds to invest in the
market nonindexed options expose the managers to market risk that they would
148
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2. Optimal Contracting Explanations
So why don’t we observe indexed options? Financial economists have
offered several explanations. As we will see, however, none of the
explanations offered is fully convincing.
(i) Cost of Indexing. It has been suggested that it may be too costly to
filter out industry or market noise through indexing.149 However, the
economic cost of filtering does not seem to be a plausible explanation for the
absence of indexed options. A wide variety of sector and broader market
indices are reported daily in the Wall Street Journal and are available on-line
from numerous sources. Moreover, the SEC’s executive compensation
disclosure regulations already require public corporations to select and
present industry, line-of-business, or peer-group stock price performance
data.150 Firms are thinking about the relevant indices and tracking this data
already. Incorporating this information into their option plans would be
trivial.
(ii) Encouraging Managers to Enter Other Industries. An alternative
explanation that has been put forward is that the optimal agency contract
might not involve filtering out industry noise. Shareholders, it is postulated,
may prefer incentives that prompt executives to adapt to poor industry
conditions, presumably by shifting company resources into more profitable
sectors.151 There are two problems with this explanation, however. First, it is
not clear that investors want established firms to shift between industries.
Investors can diversify across industries as they choose. Having decided to
invest in an industry and to accept the sector-specific risk, diversified
investors simply may want their firms to outperform the others in that
sector. Second, and more fundamentally, even if investors are seeking
maximum absolute performance rather than maximum performance within a
sector, indexing remains advantageous. A firm that was concerned about
this effect would employ a relatively broad index, such as the S&P 500,
rather than an industry-specific index.152
have been exposed to in any event). Our focus is on the fact that the random noise
associated with non-indexed options has significant positive value.
149 See Surya N. Janakiraman et al., An Empirical Investigation of the Relative
Performance Evaluation Hypothesis, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 53, 53-69 (1992).
150 See Regulation S-K, Item 402 (l).
151 See Surya N. Janakiraman et al., An Empirical Investigation of the Relative
Performance Evaluation Hypothesis, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 53 (1992); cf. Ronald A. Dye,
Relative Performance Evaluation and Project Selection, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 27 (1992)
(arguing that managers who are paid based on performance relative to their sector
will prefer to operate in industries where their relative talent, not their absolute
talent, is greatest).
152 Dye suggests that this phenomenon explains why implicit RPE studies
have found that broad market price movements are more significant determinants
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(iii) Softening Industry Competition. Strategic considerations underlie a
third explanation for the absence of indexed options.153 There is evidence
that executive compensation is positively related to the performance of rival
firms, particularly in industries that are subject to high levels of product
competition, and it has been suggested that implicitly linking pay to rival
firm performance in such cases serves shareholders by softening
competition.154 But once again, while collusion among firms in competitive
markets might explain the lack of sector indexing, the theory does not
explain why these companies fail to index options against a broad market
measure. And implicit collusion of this nature cannot explain the lack of
indexing in highly competitive industries with low barriers to entry or
industries in which competition comes from abroad. Finally, the limited
evidence concerning explicit relative performance evaluation cuts against
these strategic explanations: In annual incentive plans where we do observe
such explicit evaluation, industry peer group comparison is overwhelmingly
favored over broad-based comparison.155 So the implicit collusion theory
does not appear to offer strong support for firms’ complete failure to index
options.
(iv) Market Rises and CEO Shortage. Himmelberg and Hubbard offer a
fourth explanation for firms’ failure to filter out broad market effects.156
They find evidence that CEO compensation is positively related to market
returns and that the market effect on compensation is larger in larger firms.
They argue that this evidence can be explained by the inelasticity in the
supply of individuals who are qualified to run large firms.157 On their
theory, the demand for executives rises when the economy is robust and
of compensation than are industry price movements. See Ronald A. Dye, Relative
Performance Evaluation and Project Selection, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 27 (1992).
153 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation,
Relative Performance Evaluation, and Strategic Competition: Theory and Evidence, 54
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1999 (1999).
154 See id.
155 See Murphy, supra note 3 at Table 9 (reporting that only 10% of firms that
employed RPE in annual incentive plans utilized a broad-based peer group
measure).
156 See Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G. Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the
Market for CEO’s: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (working paper,
1999). See also Paul Oyer, Why do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
(working paper, 2000) (presenting model in which it is optimal to pay individuals
for group-level, industry-level, or economy-wide performance because agents’
opportunities are correlated with aggregate performance and it is costly to adjust
terms of employment contracts).
157 See Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G. Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the
Market for CEO’s: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (working paper,
1999).
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companies need to pay CEO’s more to retain them. Allowing stock option
rewards to increase with increasing market levels during boom periods
responds to this need. CEO talent is more important and the supply less
elastic in the case of large firms, they suggest, and for this reason large firms
need to make executive pay even more sensitive to broad stock market
levels.158
This theory, however, does not adequately explain standard
compensation practices that tie executive incentives to broad stock price
increases. Consider a company that signs a three-year contract with its CEO
that gives the executive options that vest gradually over the three-year
period. Suppose that the company seeks to address a scenario in which, after
two of the three years, the economy booms, the stock market rises, and the
executive is tempted to switch to a higher paying rival. Increasing the value
of unvested options at this point to reflect the market upswing and
hypothesized increased demand for CEO’s might assist in retention. Twothirds of the options would have vested, however, and increasing the value
of vested but unexercised options would further increase the executive’s
compensation without increasing the executive’s opportunity cost of
departing. If a company is concerned about retention in the foregoing
scenario, establishing a mechanism through which executives are issued
additional indexed options in the event of a market boom would be superior
to granting non-indexed options.
(v) Excessive risk alteration. Saul Levmore has suggested a fifth
explanation for the lack of indexing: “super-risk alteration.” 159 According to
Levmore, indexed options would encourage managers to differentiate their
firms from the index in order to increase the likelihood that their options
would be in–the-money. This, in turn, could cause managers to forego the
best projects in favor of lower-value projects that have higher volatility
(relative to the index).160
But even if indexing affects managers’ choice of projects, it is not clear
that indexing would overall worsen managers’ decision-making. Indeed, it
could have the opposite effect. It is well understood that risk-averse
See id.
See Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1901 (2001).
160
Levmore acknowledges that the problem with indexed options he
identifies cannot explain the failure to give indexed options to employees who
either (1) do not have control over the firm’s project choice and (2) are easily
monitored. To explain the failure to give indexed options to these categories of
employees, Levmore argues that a norm of “non-conflicting fortunes” prevents
firms from distributing options in such a way that some employees’ options would
be in-the-money and others would be out-of-the-money. Thus, the need to give
some employees (including the CEO) conventional options requires that every other
employee get conventional options.
158
159
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managers tend to prefer low volatility projects, even when they do not
maximize the present value of the firm’s assets. Options, which increase the
reward to managers for choosing projects with more volatile distributions,
give managers an incentive to choose riskier projects. Indeed, that is one of
the reasons managers are given options in the first instance. However, there
is no reason to believe that ordinary options completely overcome the effects
of managerial risk aversion. Managers might still avoid some high-value but
high-volatility projects. In such a case, if indexing were to affect managers’
project choice it would overall improve the quality of projects chosen.
In addition, even if Levmore is correct that indexing would overall
worsen the quality of projects selected by managers, it does not
automatically follow that this effect would be sufficiently large to overcome
the potential benefits of indexing – namely, the increased incentive to exert
effort. Finally, even if the adverse effect suggested by Levmore were
sufficiently large to outweigh the benefits of indexed-options in most cases,
there is no reason to believe that indexed options would create worse overall
incentives in every firm. Yet it appears that only publicly-traded firms uses
indexed options. The potentially adverse risk alteration effects of indexed
options is thus unlikely to account for their almost complete absence.
(vi) Tax advantage of non-indexed options. Sixth, David Schizer has
identified a potential tax advantage of conventional options over indexed
options that could, it is argued, be a partial explanation for the absence of
indexing.161 As noted in Part II.B.1, since 1994 the annual pay of a CEO or top
officer pay in excess of $1 million has not been deductible by a publicly held
corporation unless the excess compensation is performance-based: namely,
the compensation is based upon the achievement of performance goals
established by a compensation committee composed solely of independent
outside directors.162 Both traditional and indexed options qualify as
performance-based.163 However, because a traditional option does not screen
out market- and/or industry-effects, the option provides some value to
managers that is not performance-based. Thus, a traditional option offers
non-performance-based pay that is exempt from the $1 million deductibility
cap. The tax benefit identified by Schizer would be useful to a firm that
wishes to give a manager non-performance-based pay in excess of $1 million,
and prepared to give that pay in the form of a call on the market.
However, indexed options were rare even before this rule (which took
effect in 1994) was enacted in 1993. Thus, Schizer acknowledges that this tax
advantage cannot entirely explain the uniform use of traditional options.
See David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U. PENN.
L. REV. 1941 (2001).
162 See IRC § 162m.
163
See David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1941, 1942 (2001).
161
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More importantly, it is not clear why, in an optimal contracting framework, a
firm would wish to give a manager this type of tax-favored compensation. A
call on the market (1) has no useful incentive effects for the manager and (2)
because of its riskiness, is worth less to the manager than its cost to the firm.
Thus, it is a highly inefficient form of compensation. The value of this call
instead could be used to give the manager more indexed options and,
therefore, greater incentive to generate value, at no additional tax cost to the
firm.
(vii) The futility of indexing. Finally, it has been argued that indexing
might be futile because managers can always make adjustments in their
portfolios to offset the effect of indexing.164 According to this argument,
managers’ outside investments generally are not restricted. If a manager is
given indexed options (which, for example, screen out market effects), she
can use personal assets to invest in the market portfolio in such a way that
the combination of (i) the indexed options and (ii) her market portfolio
investment generates the returns of a conventional, non-indexed option on
her firm’s stock. If such adjustments can be made, the argument goes, then
there is no purpose to incurring transaction costs to create indexed options in
the first instance.
To be sure, a manager given indexed options can invest her own
funds in a benchmark portfolio, whose value is independent of the
manager’s efforts, that is designed to undo the indexing of her options. But
this investment does not hurt the firm’s shareholders. For the firm’s
shareholders, it matters little whether the manager uses her private funds to
buy a benchmark portfolio designed to undo the indexing or some other set
of stocks.
In contrast, shareholders would be hurt if the firm’s funds were used
to give the manager such a portfolio. Giving the manager such a portfolio
would cost shareholders money and (by definition) have no effect on the
manager’s incentives. But in giving the manager a conventional option the
firm in effect gives the manager such an offsetting portfolio. In particular,
the firm gives the manager a combination of (i) an indexed option and (ii) the
offsetting portfolio. Thus, when the firm’s compensation dollars are used to
give the manager unindexed options, some of those dollars are spent to give
the manager compensation that is not likely to generate any value for
shareholders.
In short, the ability of the manager to undo indexing through
adjustment to her own portfolio does not mean that the firm should use its
limited compensation dollars to give the manager compensation that is
entirely unrelated to her performance.

164

See Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Risk Sharing and Incentives: Theory and
Empirical Results (working paper, 2000).
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3. Is there an Accounting Constraint on Indexing?
A final and very commonly voiced explanation for the lack of
indexing deserves special attention. Most practitioners and many academics
attribute the dearth of indexing, at least in part, to the unfavorable
accounting treatment of these options.165 Under FASB rules, a company is
not required to take a charge against earnings when it issues an option with a
pre-determined exercise price and expiration date and that exercise price
exceeds the fair market value of the stock at the date of the grant.166
Accordingly, traditional at-the-money (or out-of-the-money) stock options
produce no corporate earnings charge, ever. Indexed options, however, lack
a fixed exercise price and therefore fall outside of this charge-free zone.
Companies issuing indexed options must mark these options against the
market on a regular basis and accrue an earnings charge reflecting the
appreciation in the value of the option over the indexed exercise price. So,
the argument runs, traditional options are preferred over indexed options
because the former result in higher reported earnings, which enhance share
value.167
However, firms not reporting the actual cost of regular options as an
expense are required to disclose via footnotes to their financial statements
pro forma net income and earnings per share figures that include a fair value
accounting adjustment for these options.168
Given the pro forma disclosure requirement, one may question
whether the “unfavorable” treatment of indexed options affects the stock
price of a company that adopts these options. Are stock prices affected
differently if an earnings charge appears in the income statement rather than
in the footnotes? If stock prices reflect all publicly available information in
accordance with the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis,169 the location of the disclosure does not matter, indexed options

See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3 at 21; Brian Hall and Jeffrey B. Liebman,
The Taxation of Executive Compensation 6, NBER Working Paper 7596 (2000)
(reporting practitioners’ assertion that option plans with “bad accounting” are not
seriously considered).
166 See APB Opinion No. 25; RONALD L. GROVES, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
214.04 (1992).
167 To the extent that the managers’ bonuses are based on reported earnings,
higher earnings also increase the bonus. But presumably if the board was
sophisticated enough to use indexed options, it would understand that the bonus
formula would need to be adjusted to reflect the accounting effect of these options.
168 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 at 14.
169 See BREALEY AND MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2000).
165
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are not more costly for firms, and the accounting difference is simply a red
herring.170
If, on the other hand, the disclosure mechanism does affect a
company’s stock price, we must consider what inferences can be drawn from
firms’ failure to index. It may be that executives avoid indexed options and
the corresponding charge to earnings because these charges have a negative
impact on the firms’ stock prices. If so, avoiding indexing might be in the
shareholders’ interest.171 But this would be the case only if (i) the market is
inefficient; (ii) the market is sufficiently inefficient that there will be a
substantial short-term decline in the price from moving to indexed options
(in the long run, presumably, the stock price will reflect the fundamental
value of the firm)172; and (iii) the cost of the short-term decline in share price
to shareholders (who might sell in the interim for liquidity reasons) is greater
than any direct benefit of an index scheme.
Note that it might be possible to achieve some form of indexing
without adversely affecting accounting earnings. We put forward here for
illustration two such mechanisms. There may well be others.
Begin by considering the following set of paired transactions. In the
first transaction, the firm gives the CEO fixed-price options with an exercise
price equal to the market price on the date of grant. As explained earlier,
under FASB rules such a grant would not adversely affect accounting
Responding to the concern that investors may be misled by the company
disclosing options expense only by footnote, Microsoft’s CFO noted, “the Street
figures it out pretty fast.” See Laura Jereski, Share the Wealth: As Options Proliferate,
Investors Question Effect on Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at A1. See also
Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr.1999 (arguing that accounting treatment of indexed
options should be ignored for the reasons we have described). Some firms,
however, do actively manage income through their accounting choices, and some
weak evidence has been produced in support of the proposition that executive stock
options are used by firms in preference to cash and in preference to incentive
schemes with “bad accounting” as part of a broader income management strategy.
See Steven R. Matsunaga, The Effects of Financial Reporting Costs on the Use of Employee
Stock Options, 70 ACCT. REV. 1 (1995).
171 Inexplicably, some stock analysts apparently ignore options expense if
the figure is not incorporated into earnings. See Laura Jereski, Share the Wealth: As
Options Proliferate, Investors Question Effect on Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997,
at A1 (reporting that “[i]n a recent survey of 300 top Wall Street stock analysts, eight
of 10 said they would disregard stock options entirely, as long as companies don’t
have to take a charge for them”). Such survey evidence, of course, may tell us little
about the actual incorporation of information disclosed in footnotes into stock
prices.
172 There is considerable evidence that the market sees through obvious
accounting manipulations, which suggests that many in the market would ignore
the change in accounting earnings due to a one-time move to indexed options.
170
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earnings. Next, the CEO gives the firm the right to a payment equal to the
excess, if any, of (a) an index over (b) the market price on the date of grant.
The payment would become due if and when the CEO exercises his fixed
price options. The second transaction creates an asset for the firm and thus
presumably would not adversely affect accounting earnings. However, the
two transactions together create a semi-indexed option that would remove
the reward to the CEO from stock price rises that are sector- or market-wide
and thus unlikely to be the result of the CEO’s efforts. The money saved
could be made available to shareholders or used to provide additional
incentive options to the CEO.
A numerical example might be helpful.
Suppose that ABC
Corporation’s stock is trading at $100. ABC would like to give the CEO 1000
options with an exercise price equal to the current market price multiplied by
some index, say, the percentage appreciation of the market. Were ABC to
give the CEO such indexed options, FASB rules would require that ABC
mark the options to market and report an accounting expense whenever the
stock price exceeds the exercise price. Instead, ABC could give the CEO 1000
regular options with a fixed exercise price equal to the market price, which
under FASB rules would not result in an accounting charge. The CEO could
then give ABC the right to payment of an amount equal to
1000x[$100x(1+max (M, 0))-$100] or, equivalently, 1000x[$100xmax(M, 0)],
where M is the percentage appreciation of the market from the date of the
option grant. The payment would become due whenever the CEO exercises
his fixed price options. Thus suppose that on the date the CEO exercises his
options the stock price is $150 and the market has increased by 30%. In such
a case, the CEO makes $50,000 exercising his options 1000 at a strike price of
$100, but this exercise triggers an obligation to pay $30,000 to the firm.
Thus, the CEO would net $20,000 the amount by which the value of the
options exceeded the index amount. The contingent obligation of the CEO
should appear on ABC’s financial statement, if at all, as an asset, and should
not give rise to an accounting charge.
The second indexing scheme does not involve creating a contingent
obligation for the executive. Instead, tranches of fixed-price options are
issued to the executive at every whole dollar stock price equal to or higher
than the current market price. After the options vest, the executive would be
permitted to exercise on any given day those options whose strike price
corresponded most closely to the value of the index on that day. The
remaining tranches of options would then be cancelled. This scheme would
not adversely affect the firm’s earnings because all of the options that have
been issued have a fixed exercise price that is greater than or equal to the
market price of the stock on the date of the option grant.
Again, suppose that ABC’s stock is trading at $10, and that ABC
would like to give the CEO 1000 options with an exercise price equal to the

64

current market price multiplied by a market index. That is, ABC wishes to
give the CEO 1000 options with an exercise price of $100(1+max (M, 0)).
However, such options could trigger an accounting charge under FASB
rules. Instead, ABC issues 1000 options to the CEO with a strike price of
$100, 1000 options with a strike price of $101, 1000 options at a strike price of
$102, etc., all the way up to a strike price of say, $200. On the date that the
CEO wishes to exercise his options, he is permitted to exercise only those
options whose strike price equals $100(1+max (M, 0)).
In offering these two possible solutions to the problem of the
accounting treatment of indexed options, we are not asserting that the FASB
would treat the proposed option schemes as treats regular fixed-price
options. The point is to show that there may be possible ways around the
accounting constraint that firms could explore if firms wished to give CEO’s
indexed options without reporting a charge to earnings.
However, executives may be avoiding indexed options primarily
because they believe the increased salience of the charge to earnings will
draw additional negative attention to their option compensation. So, even if
the method of disclosing options affects stock prices, we cannot be sure
whether executives are avoiding indexed options to enhance shareholder
value or to camouflage rent extraction.
Indeed, this fear of exposure may explain managers’ fierce resistance
to the FASB’s attempt to rationalize options accounting. Financially, there is
no plausible justification for the disparate treatment of indexed and nonindexed instruments, and the FASB attempted several years ago to impose a
requirement that all stock-based compensation be accounted for on a rational
and consistent basis, essentially in line with the current treatment of indexed
options.173 Encountering heated resistance, the FASB stopped short of
requiring firms to adopt its “fair value” method of option accounting and
settled for enhanced disclosures.174 Companies that fail to adopt the new
standards voluntarily and continue to employ the traditional accounting
methods (i.e., essentially all firms) were required to disclose the information
in footnotes, which is where we now stand.175
If options accounting matters, one can see why individual firms
would not adopt a more stringent reporting mechanism voluntarily, but why
would firms react so harshly to across-the-board imposition of such a logical
See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123.
See GRAFF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991).
175 See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 at 14.
The
impact of these adjustments can be quite significant. Footnotes to Microsoft’s 19951996 fiscal year income statement revealed that accounting for options would have
reduced pretax income from $3.4 billion to $2.8 billion and earnings per share from
$3.43 to $2.85. See Laura Jereski, Share the Wealth: As Options Proliferate, Investors
Question Effect on Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at A1.
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change in accounting practice? As the FASB has noted, options have value,
the award of valuable instruments to employees should be recognized as
compensation expense, and the value of options can be estimated with
sufficient accuracy for recognition.176 Moreover, the current irrational
distinction between the accounting treatment of traditional options and all
other forms of employee compensation apparently leads to distorted
compensation practices. At the very least, one would have expected firms
that rely less heavily on options to have supported FASB’s proposal, and
companies that rely more heavily on options to have opposed it. But the
proposal received little or no corporate support.
The uniformly negative reaction of corporate America to the FASB’s
proposals does make sense, however, if executives are concerned primarily
about increased visibility and increased negative reaction to their stock
options. Whether he receives a relatively large option award or a relatively
small one, no executive has an interest in having more attention drawn to his
options.
4. The Rent Extraction Explanation for Not Indexing
While accounting treatment may play some role in option plan design,
there is little doubt that if corporate America wanted to level the playing
field between indexed and non-indexed options it could do so.
Rationalization is, after all, one of the goals of the FASB. So we must
continue to look deeper for the real barrier to indexing. We believe that the
absence of indexed options fits in nicely with the rent extraction view of
executive compensation. It is quite conceivable that executives choose to
forego indexed options and utilize regular options because the latter are seen
as legitimate and because they provide greater net value to their recipients.
First, regular options are legitimate. Although many commentators
favor indexed options,177 the use of non-indexed options generally is
regarded as a legitimate and standard practice. Observers have begun to
question the size of some regular option grants, but the design of these
options appears to be well established and well accepted.
Second, using regular options instead of the same number of indexed
options considerably increases executives’ gains. We noted above, but did
not explain in detail, that the expected value of a regular option is
substantially greater than that of an indexed option. The non-indexed return
on a stock is equal to the indexed return plus the market return. Since the
market return has a substantial expected value for any given period, the
value of a non-indexed option is much greater than that of an indexed
See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 at 28.
See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with
Performance, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr.1999.
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option. An executive of a company that performs no better than the market
might receive no gains from an indexed option, but would receive
substantial gains from a non-indexed option in any case in which the firm’s
stock price increases over time.
Thus, to switch to indexed options and maintain the same expected
payout, considerably more options would have to be granted. However, if
the size of the option grant, i.e., the number of options granted, is the most
salient aspect of option awards to observers, outrage may be increased by
switching to indexed options. Explicitly or implicitly, analysts continue to
judge option grants by benchmarking them against the grants of other firms.
To be sure, firms that adopt indexed options can attempt to explain to
analysts and investors that the size of indexed and non-indexed grants are
not comparable, but some observers may be skeptical, and the larger indexed
option grants may draw unwarranted outrage. Thus, rent extraction
considerations might be best served by using non-indexed options.
Of course, in certain situations indexing makes executives better off.
In particular, if the index declines from the issue date to the exercise date, the
exercise price will fall, increasing the profits from exercise of the option. As
explained earlier, the amount by which executives would be made better off
in such cases is likely to be less, on average, than the amount by which they
would be made worse off when the index increases. However, executives are
risk averse, and thus might be willing to make such a tradeoff. One might
ask, therefore, why managers don’t find this aspect of indexing sufficiently
appealing.
The answer, we believe, is quite simple. As will be explained in
Section C, when the stock price declines, executives might be able to get their
options repriced at a lower exercise price. In such a case, they have ex post
indexing on the downside. However, when the stock price increases for
reasons unrelated to the CEO’s performance, the options are not repriced at a
higher price and the CEO gets to benefit fully. Thus the CEO is in the
position of “heads I win, tails I don’t lose.” And this is better for the CEO
than indexing, where there is a favorable adjustment on the downside but
also an unfavorable adjustment on the upside.
5. Implicit Relative Performance Evaluation
Firms’ failure to index options is very hard to reconcile with optimal
contracting. Before moving on, however, we should consider whether
evidence of implicit relative performance evaluation might explain or
mitigate the omission. Implicit relative performance evaluation refers to the
ability of companies to take relative performance into account ex post in
adjusting bonuses and future salary, and in deciding whether to retain an
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executive. We conclude for three reasons that such implicit evaluation does
not fill the gap left by firms’ failure to index.
First, the evidence of implicit relative performance evaluation is far
from overwhelming. A fair number of empirical studies have examined the
relationship between executive compensation and relative firm performance.
Gibbons and Murphy have offered support for the relative performance
evaluation theory, finding that changes in CEO pay and the probability of
CEO retention were positively and significantly related to firm performance,
but negatively and significantly related to industry and broader market
performance.178 But other studies have been less successful in finding
evidence to support the implicit relative performance evaluation hypothesis.
One analysis found little evidence of relative evaluation in the cash
compensation paid to CEO’s over the 1970 to 1988 period.179 In two studies,
Aggarwal and Samwick found evidence flatly inconsistent with the theory.180
In one study, they found executive compensation to be positively related to
rival firm performance.181 Also inconsistent with this hypothesis, at least to
some extent, is the evidence that CEO compensation increases with relative

See Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation
for Chief Executive Officers, 43 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 30 (1990) (examining 19741986 data); Jerold B. Warner et al, Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 461 (1988) (finding that top management changes are better predicted by
relative firm performance than by absolute firm performance). Several earlier
studies found evidence of a correlation between CEO compensation and relative
stock returns, but the evidence generally was weak. See, e.g., Rick Antle and Abbie
Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate
Executives, 24 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 1 (1986) (finding evidence consistent with the RPE
hypothesis among less than half of the firms analyzed); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate
Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. ECON. 11
(1985); Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. Schmidt, Executive Compensation,
Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation, 7 J. ACCT.
ECON. 43 (1985).
179 See Surya N. Janakiraman et al., An Empirical Investigation of the Relative
Performance Evaluation Hypothesis, 30 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 53 (1992); John E. Garen,
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1175 (1994)
(finding little evidence of implicit RPE); Martin J. Conyon, Corporate Governance and
Executive Compensation, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 493 (1997).
180 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation,
Relative Performance Evaluation, and Strategic Competition: Theory and Evidence, 54
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1999 (1999); Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, The
Other Side of The Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation 107 J. POL.
ECON. 65 (1999).
181 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation,
Relative Performance Evaluation, and Strategic Competition: Theory and Evidence, 54
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1999 (1999).
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firm performance but increases more significantly with increases in market
returns.182
Second, even if there were strong evidence of a correlation between
firm-specific performance and executive pay, this would not necessarily
imply a significant dollar effect for the executives and a significant degree of
relative performance evaluation. Stock options are driving executive
compensation and these options are not indexed, although they easily could
be. Thus, a finding that executive salaries vary to some extent with firmspecific performance would not be convincing evidence of optimal relative
performance evaluation and would not explain why stock options – the
dominant compensation element – would not be subject to relative
performance evaluation.
B. Uniform Use of At-the-Money Options
An analysis of options granted to the CEO’s of 1000 large companies
in 1992 determined that 95% of the options were granted at-the-money, that
is, with an exercise price equal to the company’s stock price on the date of
the grant.183 No one has provided a convincing explanation for this
phenomenon, which Hall and Murphy call “striking.”184
1. The Puzzle for the Optimal Contracting View
There is a debate in the literature as to the optimal exercise price for
executive stock options, and researchers have identified various factors that
might be relevant for this question.185 It is highly unlikely, however, that a
See Charles P. Himmelberg and R.G. Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the
Market for CEO’s: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity (working paper,
1999).
183 See Murphy, supra note 3.
184 See Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified
Executives 2 (working paper, 2000).
185 Options normally encourage executives to take on additional risk. See,
e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Standard in Incentive Contracts, 30 JOURNAL OF
ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 245 (working paper, 2000). Because most managers
are under-diversified and risk averse, it generally is assumed that encouraging
executives to take on additional risk is positive for shareholders. See Richard A.
DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and
Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617 (1990). But option awards produce complex and dynamic
incentives. Certain option designs may cause executives to take on too much or too
little risk, and the incentives vary as options move in and out of the money. Under
certain assumptions about managerial risk aversion, managers’ reservation utility,
and project choices, it is possible to show that at-the-money options are optimal. See
Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Optimal Compensation for Risk-Averse Executives with
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single design would be optimal for all companies and all executives.186
Option values and the incentives they create depend on a stock’s volatility,
the grantee’s stock holdings, and the grantee’s general level of risk
aversion.187 Moreover, the shape of the desired incentive will depend on a
firm’s growth opportunities, debt load, and other factors.188 These variables
will differ from firm to firm or even from executive to executive.189 Thus,
Career Concerns (working paper, 2001). But under other assumptions at-the-money
options are not optimal. See Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive Compensation,
Managerial Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Risky Projects (working paper, 2000). Cf.
Tom Nohel and Steven Todd, Executive Compensation, Reputation, and Risk-Taking
Incentives, (working paper, 2001) (showing that in-, at-, or out of the money options
can align incentives depending on the circumstances). Some analysts conclude that
at-the-money options provide managers with suboptimal pay-for-performance
incentives.
See Brian J. Hall, A Better Way to Pay CEO’s?, in EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE, 35 (J. Carpenter and D. Yermack, eds.,
1999) (arguing that some firms could improve their executive compensation
practices by adopting out-of-the-money and indexed options, which provide greater
sensitivity to performance than at-the-money options); Shane A. Johnson and
Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option
Plans, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000)(arguing that premium options create more powerful
incentives than at-the-money options of equal value); Robert A. Lambert et al.,
Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 129
(1991) (arguing that options that are very likely to wind up in the money actually
increase executive risk aversion); David Brookfield and Phillip Ormrod, Executive
Stock Options: Volatility, Managerial Decisions, and Agency Costs, 10 JOURNAL OF
MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 275 (2000).
186 See Yisong S. Tian, Optimal Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of
Executive Stock Options 40 (working paper, 2001) (arguing that the optimal exercise
price depends on the level of risk aversion and could be in-, at-, or out-of-the money
depending on the executive and concluding that the uniform practice of granting atthe-money options is not supported by principal-agent theory).
187 See Tom Nohel and S. Todd, Executive Compensation, Managerial Risk
Aversion, and the Choice of Risky Projects 7 (working paper, 2000).
188
See Chongwoo Choe, Executive Stock Options and Investment Choice
(working paper, 1999). Cf. Harley E. Ryan Jr. and Roy A Wiggins III, The Influence of
Firm- and Manager-Specific Characteristics on the Structure of Executive Compensation, 7
J. CORP. FIN. 101 (2001) (finding that CEO compensation is affected by such firm
specific factors as R&D and capital expenditure intensities and such managerspecific factors as the CEO’s age).
189
See Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation:
Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (working paper,
2000). Meulbroek estimates that a typical undiversified executive of an internet
company values standard stock options at only about 53% of the options’ cost to
shareholders, while the typical undiversified NYSE executive values options at
about 70% of their cost. A partially diversified executive of these two classes of
companies would value options at about 59% and 88% of their cost to shareholders,
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there is no reason for the optimal exercise price to be the same for all
companies.
It is difficult to explain the uniform use of at-the-money options
within an optimal-contracting framework. Options that are granted in-themoney do have to be taken into earnings, whereas at-the-money and out-ofthe-money options do not. As we explained in the previous section,
however, unfavorable accounting explanations of company behaviors are not
fully convincing. Moreover, this explanation fails to explain the uniformity
observed unless one believes that out-of-the-money options never are
optimal. 190
While many have noticed that there is near-uniformity among the
exercise price of options, little attention has been given to the fact that there
are actually two dimensions along which this uniformity occurs: (1) any
given firm will use the same exercise price for options regardless of the
vesting period of the option – e.g., an option that vests in a year has the same
exercise price as an option that vests in five years; and (2) almost all firms
use the same formula for determining this exercise price, namely, the current
market price.
The literature has, as we saw earlier, focused on the second pattern.
But it has not fully considered the first – that exercise prices are uniform
across vesting periods. Note that since prices go up on average, an option
that is issued at the current market price is likely to be in the money in the
future and its effect on effort then would be equivalent to the effect on effort
today of an option that is in-the-money today. We certainly do not attempt
respectively. Her analysis strongly suggests that one-size-fits-all option plans are
suboptimal.
190
In recent work, Hall and Murphy use numerical simulations in an
attempt to derive optimal exercise prices under various assumptions about the
shape of managerial utility functions, managerial wealth, the stock market return,
and the volatility of the firm’s stock . Under a range of parameters, they show that
the exercise price that maximizes pay-for-performance sensitivity is usually in a
range that includes the current market price. See Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy,
Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 AMERICAN ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 209 (2000). See also Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy,
Stock Options for Undiversified Executives 20-22 (working paper, 2000). However,
their analysis cannot explain why, as they report, 94% of option grants are at-themoney. First, there is no evidence that the utility functions they use -- which are
designed to make their calculations tractable -- correspond to those of actual
managers. Second, the analysis does not take into account the incentive effects of
the options on managerial behavior and the stock price. Third, even if their
parameters corresponded to the situations of actual CEO’s and incentive effects
could be ignored, their parameters generate a range of optimal exercise prices, some
of which (under certain conditions) are out-of-the-money. Yet almost all option
grants are at-the-money.
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to try to analyze here what would be the optimal exercise price of options
that are going to vest a number of years from now. This might depend on
the time value of money and the rate of inflation. An option exercisable at
the current market price that vests in 5 years will in real terms have an
exercise price much lower than the current market price. But the important
point is that there is little reason to think that the optimal formula would be
not only uniform across companies but also uniform across vesting periods.
2. The Rent Extraction Explanation
Under optimal contracting, the exercise price of options should be set
to maximize shareholder value and since there is reason to believe that the
value-maximizing exercise price might differ across vesting periods and
across firms, the uniformity along both dimensions poses a puzzle. Under
the rent extraction view, however, the near-uniform use of at-the-money
executive stock option plans can be easily explained. Under that view,
managers are not seeking exercise prices that are value-maximizing for
shareholders but rather exercise prices that are value-maximizing for
managers – namely, the lowest possible exercise price consistent with other
constraints.
At-the-money options might well provide the best combination of
high rent extraction and low outrage. Holding the number of options
granted equal, executives prefer the lowest possible exercise price. Each
dollar of strike price reduction is a dollar gained once the option is in the
money. Thus, executives prefer an option that bears the lowest possible
strike price without causing outrage. Granting in-the-money options would
appear to provide a gift to the executives – “incentive” compensation that
requires no improvement in performance – and thus would likely spark
outrage. Providing at-the-money options, however, can be justified on the
basis of incentive generation. The empirical observation that exercise prices
are uniformly tied to the company’s stock price on the date of the grant,
regardless of the length of the option contract, the type of company, and the
stage of the executive’s career – all factors relevant for economic
optimization – is most consistent with a constraint based on saliency and
outrage.191

The number of options issued also is quite salient. The size of option
grants generally is determined through surveys and benchmarking. Thus,
increasing the size of an option grant to adjust for a higher strike price may produce
outrage even if the increase is justified economically and represents a fair tradeoff
for shareholders. This phenomenon also would encourage executives intent on
maximizing rent extraction to select the lowest justifiable option exercise price.
191
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In addition, the grant of in-the-money options would force the firm to
reduce accounting earnings by the amount by which the options are in-themoney. As we noted earlier, we are skeptical about the force of the
accounting explanation for the lack of indexing. Rather, we think that firms
use accounting effects as an excuse for not indexing. However, firms could
not use in-the-money options with their adverse accounting effects and still
maintain that adverse accounting effects prevented them from using indexed
options.
Because setting the exercise price below the current market price
might create outrage and strip away one of the excuses for not indexing, it is
not surprising that exercise prices are set at the lowest possible price –
current market price – and that those prices are used regardless of the
vesting period.
C. Resetting of Option Exercise Prices
In many cases corporations have lowered the strike prices of options
when their stock prices fell below the original exercise prices, but firms have
rarely raised strike prices in a rising market. This one-sided practice of
resetting is yet another feature of option practice that is puzzling from an
optimal contracting perspective, but consistent with the rent extraction view.
Although not universal, the practice of resetting was fairly common in
the 1990s, even though the market as a whole was performing well.
Examining the S&P ExecuComp database for 1992-1995, Brenner, Sundaram
and Yermack found that, on average, 1.3% of executives had options reset
each year.192 Of 806 individual option resets, they found that the strike price
was increased in only two cases, and they calculated an average reduction in
exercise price of 39%.193 It is worth noting that the S&P 500 Index rose by
about 50% during the period studied by the authors, with no significant
downturns. The frequency of resetting is likely to be much higher in falling
markets.
1. The Resetting Puzzle
Ex post adjustments to compensation contracts have troubling
implications that make them difficult to explain within an optimal
See Menachem Brenner et al., Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options,
57 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (2000). See also KATHY B. RUXTON, EXECUTIVE PAY, 1997: CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER COMPENSATION AT S&P SUPER 1,500 COMPANIES AS REPORTED IN
1997 (Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1998) (finding that 3% of 1189 firms
surveyed by the IRRC repriced options in 1998).
193 See Menachem Brenner et al., Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options,
57 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (2000).
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contracting framework. Clearly, the expectation that firms will adjust ex post
for adverse stock price movements undermines ex ante incentives. Thus, the
practice of ex post resetting undermines the goal that underlies the very use
of stock option plans.194 Indeed, when executives anticipate that the exercise
price will be reset if the stock price falls they may have an incentive to take
steps to reduce the share price in the short run in order to lower the exercise
price. 195
Companies claim that these adjustments are necessary to retain and
motivate executives when prices fall to levels that make existing options far
out-of-the-money. Although ex post resetting undermines ex ante incentives
to some extent, so the argument goes, companies may determine that, on
balance, these ex post retention and incentive benefits outweigh the ex ante
costs. 196
Even when a fall in stock market price eliminates incentives, however,
optimal contracting suggests that companies should adjust option terms to
provide better incentives going forward and not merely to transfer value to
recipients. If exercise prices are reset, for example, vesting periods should be
reset as if the options were granted on the date the exercise price is reset.
There is no incentive or retention reason to give executives any benefit from
fully or partially vested options that have lost their value. Any such benefit
would therefore constitute a windfall.
It has been argued that, even if resetting is undesirable following a
company-specific price decline, it might be appropriate after a general
market downturn, because such an event is outside of the executives’ control
and the executives will add a large risk premium if there is no agreement to
adjust for general market corrections.197 But repricing regular options in the
wake of a market downturn appears to be a second-best result compared
with indexing the options against market movements in the first place. Ex
post adjustment to the terms of indexed options that automatically correct for
sector-wide, or at least market-wide, shocks generally will be less necessary,
and it certainly will be more difficult to justify.
Consider two regimes. In the first, executives receive regular options
and fall back on resetting when the market moves against them. This
arrangement allows the executives to reap the gains that come with a
market-wide rally, even if the rally simply offsets an earlier market slide. So
See Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock
Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2000)
195 See Shane Johnson and Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects of
Non-Traditional Executive Stock Option Plans, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 17 (2000).
196 See Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock
Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2000)
197 See P. Jane Saly, Repricing Executive Stock Options in a Down Market, 16 J.
ACCT. ECON. 325 (1994).
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resetting provides much more than downward price protection – options
alone provide that – resetting lets executives “buy” on major market dips.
Moreover, because the determinants of share prices are complex, executives
can justify resetting when only a fraction of the decline in their firm’s share
price actually is attributable to a market correction.
In the second scenario executives hold indexed options. With indexed
options the executives achieve only a portion of the incremental
improvement in firm value above the sector or market average. The
executives truly are insulated from broad market swings. Resetting becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to justify, and market slides do not become
opportunities for profit taking on the rebound. Thus, even if the executives
receive more indexed options to reflect their reduced expected value, as they
should, the loss of the resetting advantage leaves them worse off overall.
Optimal contracting explanations for resetting are further undermined
by empirical analyses concerning the use of this device. Brenner, Sundaram,
and Yermack find that resetting does not occur as a result of industry-wide
shocks, as one would expect if the process were used to avoid penalizing
executives for larger trends beyond their control.198 Rather, resetting is
associated with poor firm-specific stock price performance, which might
reward the management of poorly performing firms.199 Similarly, Chance,
Kumar, and Todd find that re-pricing decisions are not driven by market or
industry factors.200
2. The Rent Extraction Explanation
From the perspective of the outrage constraint, however, the resetting
arrangement makes sense. Executives’ enjoyment of large options gains
when market prices advance can be justified easily to observers in this
fashion: There was a contract; it provided incentives; all parties to the
contract – shareholders and executives – enjoyed large gains; the firm sticks
by its contracts. When the stock price drops, resetting can be justified based
on the need to retain and motivate executives as the firm moves forward. If
the company is still nervous about public reaction, it can reduce the exercise
See Menachem Brenner et al., Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options, 57
J. FIN. ECON. 103 (2000).
199 See id.
200 See Don M. Chance et al., The Repricing of Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN.
ECON. 129 (2000). See also N.K. Chidambaran and Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala,
Executive Stock Option Repricing, Internal Governance Mechanisms, and Manager
Turnover, forthcoming JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS (2001) (reporting that
repricing firms are likely to have enjoyed rapid, above-industry growth rates and
profitability two years before repricing, and a drop to below-industry growth rates
and profitability the year of repricing).
198
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price somewhat, but leave it above market to show investors that the
executives are not getting a free ride.201
The practice of resetting also must be considered in light of the failure
of companies to index options. As noted above, the combination of effects
seems to enhance executive rent extraction. Executives appear to be much
better off with regular options that may be reset than they would be with
indexed options.
Finally, empirical data also support the rent extraction explanation.
For example, Chance, Kumar, and Todd find that re-pricing is more likely
among smaller firms with boards that are dominated by insiders and
otherwise suffer from greater agency problems.202 And Callaghan, Saly, and
Subramaniam report that executives release bad news shortly before the date
on which the options are repriced and delay the release of good news until
after that date in order to reduce the exercise price on the repriced options.203
D. Executives’ Broad Freedom to Unwind Incentives
Companies claim that they use equity-based compensation as a means
of aligning incentives and increasing executive shareholding.204 But firms
take surprisingly few steps to prevent executives from unwinding the
incentives provided by the grant of options and restricted stock.205
See Menachem Brenner et al., Altering the Terms of Executive Stock Options,
57 J. FIN. ECON. 103 (2000) (reporting that the strike price was reduced but left above
market in about 20% of the resetting cases examined).
202 See Don M. Chance et al., The Repricing of Executive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN.
ECON. 129 (2000).
203 See Sandra Renfro Callaghan, P. Jane Saly, and Chandra Subramaniam,
The Timing of Option Repricing (working paper, 2000). See also David Yermack, Good
Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 JOURNAL OF
FINANCE 449 (1997)(reporting that managers manipulate news around option grants
in order to lower the exercise price).
204 See Eli Ofek and David Yermack, Taking Stock: Does Equity-Based
Compensation Increase Managers’ Ownership?, 55 J. FIN. 1367 (1997) (noting that
companies frequently cite a desire to boost executive share ownership in justifying
equity-based compensation awards).
205 It is not unusual for a firm to use “trading windows” and “blackout
periods” to restrict the times during the year that a manager can trade in the shares
in order to reduce the possibility that it will be held liable for an insider trading
violation. For example, many firms permit managers to trade only during the two
or three-week period after quarterly earnings have been released. See Carl Bettis, J.
Coles, and Michael L. Lemon, Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J.
FIN. ECON. 191 (2000). Such restrictions might impose liquidity costs on managers
by sometimes forcing managers to delay a planned trade for several months. Cf.
201
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Executives generally are not barred from hedging away equity exposure
before these instruments vest, nor are they constrained in exercising the
options and disposing of the stock acquired once vesting has occurred. The
permissive attitude of firms in this respect presents an additional puzzle for
the optimal contracting view.
All else being equal, executives generally prefer to have less of their
personal wealth tied up in the stock and options of their firm rather than
more.206 It should come as no surprise, then, that executives often sell shares
when granted options or restricted stock, exercise options well before
expiration, sell the stock acquired through option and restricted share
programs, and look for ways of hedging their exposure when disposal is not
possible.
Executives often utilize collars and equity swaps to lock in gains on
their shareholdings following a stock price increase, reducing their incentive
to boost the price further.207 When they receive options and restricted stock,
executives take steps to decrease their exposure to the risk. In particular,
executives often sell stock they already hold when the options (or restricted
shares) are granted.208 Moreover, some executives hedge or seek advice on
hedging the risks associated with restricted stock and option holdings
through the use of derivative securities.209 At the moment, several
Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive
Compensation (working paper, 2001) (finding that firms that restrict the timing of
insiders’ trades pay a 3-10% premium in total compensation). However, these
restrictions do not limit the number of shares that can be sold or the type of
transaction that can be entered into during the time trading is permitted. Thus,
these trading restrictions cannot prevent managers from selling or hedging their
equity positions.
206 As is widely recognized, executives tend to have a large proportion of
their personal wealth as well as their human capital invested in their firms. The sale
of shares (acquired through exercise of options or otherwise) permits diversification
and supports current consumption.
207 See Carr Bettis et al, Insider Trading in Derivative Securities: An Empirical
Examination of the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders
(working paper, 1999).
208
See Eli Ofek and David Yermack, Taking Stock: Does Equity-Based
Compensation Increase Managers’ Ownership?, 55 J. FIN. 1367 (1997) (finding that
managers who already owned shares in excess of the number of options (or
restricted shares) granted sold approximately 680 shares for every 1000 options
granted and 940 shares for every 1000 restricted shares granted).
209 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 440 (2000). Cf. Paul U. Ali and
Geof Stapledon, Having Your Options and Eating Them Too: Fences, Zero-Cost Collars
and Executive Share Options, 18 COMPANY & SEC. L. J. 277 (2000)(describing the use of
hedging devices by managers as an “alarming development” that subverts the
economic purpose of stock options).
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serendipitous features of the federal income tax code make it economically
unattractive for most executives to hedge unvested options and (to a lesser
extent) restricted stock through the derivatives market.210 But even modest
changes in tax rates could eliminate this barrier to hedging options.211
Once the options vest, executives exercise options well before
expiration despite the tax disincentive.212 A recent study examining ten-year
options granted to the executives of forty large companies determined that
the options were exercised after an average of 5.8 years.213 Moreover, despite
the pressure that boards supposedly put on executives to increase their
shareholdings, executives sell almost all of the shares that are acquired
through option exercise, far in excess of the level of sales required to satisfy
the taxes due.214
Firms could make it more difficult for executives to unwind
unilaterally the incentives provided by restricted stock and options.215
Generally, the only constraint faced by an executive who wishes to cash out
restricted stock or options is the vesting period placed on the instrument.
Until the instrument vests, the stock or option is forfeited if the executive
leaves the firm,216 but companies take no steps to restrict executives from
hedging away the equity risk exposure of unvested stock and options.
Moreover, after the instrument vests, the executive is free to dispose of the
See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 440 (2000).
211 Cf. Austan Goolsbee, What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from
Executive Compensation, 108 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 352 (2000) (finding
that executives adjust option exercise patterns in response to changes in marginal
tax rates).
212 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Columbia Law Review 440, 468-472 (2000)(explaining
that the deferral of taxes provides executives with a tax benefit from delaying the
exercise of nonqualified stock options).
213 See Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock
Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 139 (1998). See also Steven Huddart and Mark Lang,
Employee Stock Options Exercises: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. ACCT. ECON. 5, 20 (1996)
(analyzing stock option exercise at eight diverse firms, some of which granted
options to half or more of their employees, and reporting that among the seven
publicly traded firms the average fraction of life that had elapsed at the time of
option exercise ranged from .23 to .40).
214
See Eli Ofek and David Yermack, Taking Stock: Does Equity-Based
Compensation Increase Managers’ Ownership?, 55 J. FIN. 1367 (1997).
215 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Columbia Law Review 440 (2000).
216 Some compensation plans, however, provide for accelerated vesting in
the case of dismissal without cause or in the case of a takeover-related dismissal.
Telephone interview with Michael Meissner; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P.
(Sept. 7, 2000).
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restricted stock or exercise the option and sell the underlying stock – even if
he is expected to stay and does in fact stay with the company for a much
longer period.
We would expect an optimal principal-agent contract to place more
constraints on executives than we observe. If options are provided in order
to create incentives for executives, it is important that the risk-bearing
executive not be permitted to unwind the incentive without restriction. To
be sure, there may be circumstances in which an executive’s diversification
and consumption needs would warrant permitting an executive to cash out.
However, if options were granted to supply incentives, one would expect
that these incentives would be protected by at least some explicit contractual
constraints. The consumption and diversification arguments do not explain
why executives are permitted to unwind incentives without any restriction
whatsoever.
In addition to the standard vesting term, which provides an incentive
for an executive to remain with the company, we would expect an optimal
incentive contract to include additional specific limitations on the exercise of
some or all options and/or on the sale of the shares underlying these
options, perhaps with a process enabling early disposition in the case of
hardship. 217 We also would expect to observe contractual restrictions on
hedging restricted stock or option positions through the use of derivatives or
equity swaps.
For example, an option could be granted that vests after a certain
number of years but is not exercisable until a later point in time. Such an
arrangement would provide an executive with certainty of ownership after
the first period, but would ensure continued incentive generation over the
second period. If an executive were to leave the company after the vesting
date but before the first exercise date, the company might commit to
repurchasing the option based on some discount to the prevailing market
price so as not to encourage early exit. In any event, there is no clear reason
that vesting and first exercise must correspond, and yet this is the universal
practice.
Given the apparent difficulty of achieving the optimal level of executive
equityholding, it seems unwise to provide executives unfettered discretion over this
variable. Too little shareholding apparently produces insufficient incentives and
reduces shareholder value, while too much shareholding has the same end result,
presumably because of executive entrenchment. See John J. McConnell and Henri
Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON
595 (1990); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988). But see Charles P. Himmelberg et al.,
Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between
Ownership and Performance, 53 J. FIN. ECON. 353 (1998) (reporting that they are
unable to conclude econometrically that managerial ownership affects firm
performance).
217
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To be sure, the executives might have liquidity needs. But there are a
number of ways that such liquidity needs could be dealt with. For example,
one could make executives get permission to sell from the compensation
committee, which could approve the unwinding upon the showing of
liquidity needs. Or the executives could be permitted to sell their shares
slowly over time. It is unlikely that the only solution to executives’ liquidity
needs is to give them unlimited ability to unwind unrestricted shares and
vested options.
The other puzzling aspect of managers’ ability to unwind is that they
have the freedom to choose when to sell so that they can sell when they think
the price is high.218 One could, instead, require executives to sell shares back
to the corporation at the average price of the stock over the preceding year or
two.
Once again, we believe that the corporate behaviors that we have
discussed in this section are more compatible with the rent extraction model
of executive compensation than with the optimal contracting model. Under
the rent extraction view companies fail to restrict executives from unwinding
incentives because stock-based compensation largely is about providing
executives with noncontroversial compensation. As we have noted above,
compensation paid through dilution may be less visible than stock pricerelated cash compensation, which may explain why companies pay
executives in stock but remain nonchalant about subsequent sales. Options
also provide incentives, and vesting requirements help ensure that the
incentives persist for some time,219 but much of this evidence seems more
consistent with maximizing executive rent extraction than with optimizing
incentives.
E. Reload Options
The increasingly common practice of granting new, or “reload,”
options to executives who exercise options by surrendering stock is yet
another twist to conventional options plans that we think is better explained

To be sure, executives might be constrained in their ability to sell at any
particular time by firm-imposed trading windows or the securities laws. However,
even within these constraints, executives are able to trade on some forms of inside
information.
219 However, this is true only because tax rules discourage executives from
hedging options with derivatives. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The
Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Columbia Law Review 440
(2000).
218
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by the rent extraction model than by the optimal contracting model.220 Basic
reload options work as follows: The holder of an option with a reload
provision who exercises that option before expiration and pays the exercise
price with stock that he already owns receives the underlying shares
optioned plus a new option for each share tendered in exercising the options.
The new reload options carry the same expiration date as the original options
but the exercise price is set at market. For example, a CEO who held ten
reloadable options with a $20 strike price would surrender five shares of
stock to exercise the options if the market price at exercise stood at
$40/share. He would receive the ten shares optioned plus five new reload
options with a $40 strike price.221
Options with a reload provision are worth substantially more to the
holder than are conventional options. By exercising the first generation
options after a price spike, the recipient locks in a portion of the gain against
a subsequent share price decline, but the recipient loses none of the upside
potential, which is preserved fully by the reload options.222 The incremental
value of the reload feature depends on the volatility of the firm’s stock price
and other factors, but, examining one executive at one firm by way of
example, Saly, Jagannathan & Huddart estimated that basic reload options in
that case were worth about 15% more than conventional options.223
As with the failure to index options, the grant of reloads furthers the
ability of executives to capture large benefits without enhancing shareholder
value. Specifically, reload options enable executives to profit from share
price volatility even if long-term share performance is flat. Thus, reload
options provide value to executives without a clear incentive benefit.224
Reingold reports that reload provisions were included in 17% of new
stock option plans adopted in 1997. See Jennifer Reingold, Nice Option if You Can Get
It, BUS. WEEK, May 4, 1998, at 111.
221 There are several variations on the reload theme. Some plans provide for
multiple reloads, in other words, the new options issued on exercise also are
reloadable. Some reload plans provide additional reload options to replace shares
that would have to be sold to pay the tax that is due on exercise. Finally, under
some reload plans, the reload options issued on exercise carry a new or extended
term. However, recently promulgated FASB Interpretation 44 may impose
unfavorable accounting requirements on multiple reload and other variants from
the standard reload arrangement. See FASB Interpretation 44 (Mar. 2000).
222 Hemmer and colleagues demonstrate that it is optimal for the holder of a
multiple reload option to exercise whenever the stock price exceeds any previous
high price. See Thomas Hemmer et al., Optimal Exercise and the Cost of Granting
Employee Stock Options with a Reload Provision, J. ACCT. RESEARCH 231 (1998).
223 See P. Jane Saly et al., Valuing the Reload Feature of Executive Stock Options,
12 ACCT. HORIZONS 219 (1999).
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If a manager could reload repeatedly, the optimal strategy for the manager would be to
exercise his options whenever there is even a small rise over the exercise price, and then reload.
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The addition of a reload feature cannot be readily explained within
the optimal contracting model. Consider first an executive who would hold
conventional options until expiration. The reload feature simply allows this
executive to exercise the first generation options to take advantage of a price
spike along the way. If the resultant shares are sold, there is a reduction in
incentives, and the executive receives a windfall versus a conventional
option plan.
Now consider an executive who would exercise conventional options
before expiration in order to reduce risk. In this case, the reload options
provide a continuing, yet diminished, incentive after the first generation
options are exercised and the underlying shares are sold. However, the
executive could have exercised a portion of his conventional options and
achieved the same reduction in exposure. Even if there is a risk bearing
argument for reloads, moreover, that argument depends on options
comprising a portion of the reservation wage. If, as we have suggested,
option compensation often exceeds the reservation wage in order to provide
incentives, it would be more efficient for firms to prohibit early exercise than
to issue reloadable options.
Nonetheless, despite the greater cost, proponents argue that the
reload feature encourages executives to exercise options earlier and to hold
more shares.225 The reload feature does promote earlier exercise, but if the
executives sell the shares they receive on exercise, as is generally the case, 226
the reloads do not result in executives holding more shares unless there are
additional constraints on the reload program. Some reload plans place
minimum holding times on the stock surrendered on exercise or on the stock

See Christopher Gay, Hard to Lose: Options Promote Stock Ownership among
Executives: But Critics Say They’re A Lot More Costly than Shareholders Realize, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999 at R6; Jennifer Reingold, Nice Option If You Can Get It, BUS. WEEK,
May 4, 1998, at 111; Thomas Hemmer et al., Reload Employee Stock Option Plans:
Incentive Alignment or Rent Extraction 15 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND
FINANCE 393 (2000).
226 See Eli Ofek and David Yermack, Taking Stock: Does Equity-Based
Compensation Increase Managers’ Ownership?, 55 J. FIN. 1367 (1997) (examining data
from the S&P 1500 over the 1993-1995 period and finding that executives with
relatively low stock holdings retain about 30% of the shares received on exercise of
options, while relatively high ownership executives sold all shares). Although a
basic reload plan is unlikely to increase executives’ total exposure to share price,
substituting at-the-money options for far in-the-money options may result in some
improvement in incentives. See Robert A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in
Valuing Executive Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 129 (1991) (demonstrating
that options that are highly likely to end up in-the-money can increase rather than
decrease a manager’s aversion to risk).
225
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received through exercise.227 However, firms could require executives to
hold shares received through the exercise of options without introducing the
reload complication. If the goal is to increase executive share ownership, as
we discussed above, there are better and more direct ways to proceed.228
As in the case of resetting, however, the reload feature is quite
consistent with the rent extraction view of executive compensation. The
reload feature makes the options more valuable for the executives, but it
does so in a way that is complex and hard to evaluate.229 Despite their added
cost, reloads can be justified plausibly to investors. And even better, reloads
can be tweaked to provide even more value with little or no investor
reaction. We have already seen that options with the basic reload feature are
more valuable to their recipients, and we have suggested that their
justification – increasing executive stock ownership – is facially plausible, but
that the benefit is illusory unless the executives are required to hold shares
for some period prior to or following option exercise – constraints that have
little or nothing to do with reloads per se. We will now turn to the variations
in reloads that add even more value.
An executive who exercises nonqualified stock options owes ordinary
income tax on the gain. Many firms with reload programs issue additional
reload options to cover the shares that must be set aside to pay the

See Thomas Hemmer et al., Reload Employee Stock Option Plans: Incentive
Alignment or Rent Extraction 15 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINANCE
393 (2000). The authors find a significant increase in CEO shareholding following
the adoption of reload provisions.
228
In a recent paper, Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin offer empirical
evidence that provides some support for an optimal contracting view of reload
provisions. The authors find a statistically significant negative correlation between
a group of variables reflecting CEO power and the incidence of reload provisions.
They also find a positive correlation between board strength and reload incidence,
although the correlation is not statistically significant. If reload provisions facilitate
rent extraction, the authors posit, one would expect to observe greater incidence in
firms in which CEO’s have relatively greater power to extract rents. See Thomas
Hemmer et al., Reload Employee Stock Option Plans: Incentive Alignment or Rent
Extraction, 15 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINANCE 393-423 (2000).
The question remains, however, why firms should resort to the use of reload
provisions to encourage executives to hold onto more shares when more direct
approaches are available.
229 It is clear that an option with a reload feature is more valuable than a
plain vanilla option, but in a steadily rising market the reload feature affects only
the timing of the realization of the gains. Those who focus on this facet of the
market only will miss the true value of the reload provision. See Christopher Gay,
Hard to Lose: Options Promote Stock Ownership Among Executives: But Critics Say
They’re A Lot More Costly Than Shareholders Realize, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999 at R6.
227
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executive’s taxes.230 This practice is justified as necessary to maintain the
executive’s total share price exposure.231 This sounds plausible at first blush,
but in fact the tax reload provision, as it is known, is the equivalent of
making a larger conventional option grant in the first place. If, as we have
argued, the relative size of initial option grants is benchmarked against the
size of grants made by comparable firms and is a salient figure for investors,
introducing tax reloads serves to circumvent the cap on the size of initial
grants. And, of course, the larger effective grant is more valuable to the
executive and more costly for the shareholders.232
Moreover, one may ask, what is so special about the tax that is due on
the exercise of options? Most executives own a fair number of shares of
company stock and owe taxes each year on their salary, bonus, options
exercised, and restricted stock that becomes unrestricted. One could argue
as plausibly that the company should issue options to replace hypothetical
shares sales made by an executive to cover the taxes due on any of these
sources of income. In the absence of real constraints on overall executive
shareholding, it is pointless if not misleading to focus on maintaining the
number of shares and options that flow directly from the firm’s option
program.
F. Differences Between Executives with More and Less Power
The rent extraction view focuses upon the connection between
managerial power and the rents managers can extract. In all companies with
dispersed shareholders and no controlling shareholder, executives will have
See id. (reporting that 21 of 40 reload firms surveyed issue additional
options to replace shares set aside to pay taxes on option exercise).
231 See id.
232 Saly and colleagues estimated that, with the tax reload feature, the reload
options they studied were worth 24% more than conventional options. Without the
tax reload feature these reload options would have been worth 15% more than
conventional options. See P. Jane Saly et al., Valuing the Reload Feature of Executive
Stock Options, 12 ACCT. HORIZONS 219 (1999). A few companies deviate from the
standard reload design in other ways. Some issue a new option for every option
exercised, rather than for each share surrendered in exercising the options. See
Christopher Gay, Hard to Lose: Options Promote Stock Ownership among Executives: But
Critics Say They’re A Lot More Costly Than Shareholders Realize, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8,
1999 at R6 (reporting that 3 of 40 reload firms surveyed used this procedure).
Others extend or restart the term of reload options issued. See Christopher Gay,
Hard to Lose: Options Promote Stock Ownership Among Executives: But Critics Say
They’re A Lot More Costly Than Shareholders Realize, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999 at R6.
Both practices add value for executives, and one can imagine without help from us
the weak but perhaps vaguely plausible justifications that might be offered in
support of these variants.
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power and will likely be able to extract some rent. Management power,
however, is not uniform in all companies with dispersed shareholding.
Managers will have more or less power depending upon the presence of
effective takeover impediments, the structure of the board, the presence of
large shareholders (even if they are not controlling shareholders), and the
fraction of shares held by institutional investors. All else being equal, the rent
extraction view predicts that managers will extract more rent in situations
and structures in which they have more power.
Indeed, there is significant evidence suggesting that in situations in
which executives have more power, they are able to extract more rent. First,
there is evidence that CEO’s of firms that adopt anti-takeover provisions get
higher salaries, receive more options, and are more likely to have a golden
parachute arrangement.233 The mean level of above-market compensation
then increases significantly after the provisions are adopted – that is, after
the CEO has become less vulnerable to a hostile takeover.234
In addition, there is evidence that executive compensation is higher in
circumstances in which a CEO is especially powerful vis-à-vis the board.
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker find that CEO compensation is higher when
the board is larger, when more of the outside directors have been appointed
by the CEO, when the outside directors are older, and when outsiders serve
on five or more boards.235 Rather than imposing discipline on the pay
Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino, CEO
Contracting and Anti-Takeover Amendments, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1495 (1997).
234 See Kenneth A. Borokhovich, Kelly R. Brunarski, and Robert Parrino, CEO
Contracting and Anti-Takeover Amendments, 52 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1495 (1997).
Managers who have become less vulnerable to a hostile takeover take advantage of
their power in other ways as well. For example, CEO’s of firms incorporated in
states that adopt anti-takeover statutes reduce their use of debt, in order to reduce
the risk of financial distress and constraints on their use of the firms’ cash, even
though the debt is likely to have provided useful tax and agency benefits. Gerald T.
Garvey and Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of
Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 519 (1999).
235 See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999). Yermack confirms
that larger boards produce weaker CEO pay incentives. See David Yermack, Higher
Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185
(1996). Cf. Robert Evans and John Evans, The Influence of Non-Executive Director
Control and Rewards on CEO Remuneration: Australian Evidence (working paper, 2000)
(finding that CEO compensation in Australia is decreasing in the amount of equity
held by outside directors.) CEO pay also increases when a board contains
interlocking directors. See Kevin Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors
and Executive Compensation, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331 (1997). This
might not be as rare as one would imagine: in approximately 1 out of 12 firms the
board is current CEO-interlocked: the CEO of the firm (Firm A) sits on the board of
another company (Firm B), and the CEO of Firm B sits on the board of Firm A. See
233
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process, an outsider-heavy board may simply serve to legitimize the CEO’s
decision making and increase his ability to extract rent.236 There also is
evidence that the concentration of institutional investors matters. In a study
of S&P firms from 1991 through 1997, Hartzell and Starks find that more
concentrated institutional ownership is associated with reduced executive
compensation. They also find that a larger institutional presence results in
more performance sensitive compensation.237 This study suggests that the
presence of institutions serves to reduce the power of management to extract
rent through compensation.
Moreover, there is evidence that the presence of large shareholders is
significant. Even when such shareholders do not have a controlling or
dominant position, their monitoring may reduce the extraction of rent.
Richard Cyert and his colleagues found a negative relationship between the
equity ownership of the largest shareholder and the amount of CEO
compensation.238 In an analysis of manufacturing firms, Tosi and GomezMejia determined that CEO incentive alignment is superior and that the CEO
exercises less influence over setting his own compensation when the
company has a five-percent external shareholder.239
Kevin Hallock, Dual Agency: Corporate Boards with Reciprocally Interlocking
Relationships, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE (Jennifer Carpenter and David Yermack, eds.) (Kluwer Academic
Publishers: London) (1999) 55, 58 (reporting that 8% of a sample of 773 large
publicly-traded firms had CEO-interlocked boards and 12% had employeeinterlocked boards). See also Eliezer M. Fich and Lawrence J. White, Why Do CEO’s
Reciprocally on Each Other’s Boards? (working paper, 2001) (examining factors that
make reciprocal CEO board membership more likely).
236 See Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors, and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE
293 (1995). Cyert, Kang, Kumar, and Shah report that CEO pay is negatively related
to the share ownership of the board of directors and positively related to the CEO’s
share ownership and tenure and is higher if the CEO is the chairman of the board.
They also find that CEO pay is positively related to the percentage of outsiders on
the board. They surmise that many of the outside directors are hand-picked friends
of the CEO. See Richard Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and
CEO Compensation (working paper, 1997).
237 See Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive
Compensation (working paper, 2000).
238 See Richard Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and
CEO Compensation (working paper, 1997).
239 See Henry L. Tosi Jr. and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Decoupling of CEO Pay
and Performance: An Agency Theory Perspective, 34 ADMINISTRATIVE SCI. Q. 169 (1989).
See also Henry L. Tosi and Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, CEO Compensation Monitoring and
Firm Performance, 37 ACADEMY MANAGEMENT J. 1002 (1994) (finding the relationship
between monitoring and performance to be stronger in firms that lack a 5%
shareholder than in firms that have a 5% shareholder). Similarly, Benz, Kucher, and
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In three recent creative empirical studies, Bertrand and Mullainathan
than have presented findings that indicate that the absence of any
shareholders with more than five percent of the shares leads to increased
extraction of rent. One study examined differences between companies with
and without such shareholders in terms of how executive compensation
programs were affected by the passage of anti-takeover legislation.240 The
authors found that CEO pay increased in firms that lacked a large external
shareholder following the reduction in the takeover threat, and that only
firms with a large shareholder responded to the reduced takeover threat by
increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity.241
In another paper, Bertrand and Mullainathan examined differences
between companies with and without a large shareholder in terms of the
extent to which CEO’s were rewarded for changes in company performance
that were outside of their control, i.e., for luck.242 The study found that
CEO’s in firms that lacked large external shareholders tended to receive
more “luck-based” pay. Furthermore, this study also found that CEO’s in
firms that lacked large shareholders had their cash compensation reduced
less when their options-based compensation increased.243
A third study by Bertrand and Mullainathan tested differences
between companies with and without a five-percent shareholder in terms of
how the performance sensitivity of compensation relates to the volatility of
the company’s stock price.244 Under an optimal contracting view, payperformance sensitivity should decrease with increasing variance. However,
the study found the presence of such a relationship only for companies that
had a five-percent external shareholder.
Interestingly, the financial economists that conducted the above
studies, unlike most academics working in this area, came to the view that
some appropriation of wealth might be taking place in those situations in
which managers are especially powerful. Bertrand and Mullainathan, for
example, concluded that some “skimming” takes place in companies without
a five-percent shareholder.245
The above researchers, however, have
Stutzer find that a higher concentration of shareholders results in a significantly
reduced amount of options granted to top S&P 500 executives. See Matthias Benz et
al., Stock Options: The Managers’ Blessing; Institutional Restrictions and Executive
Compensation (working paper, 2000).
240 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Executive Compensation
and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation (working paper, 1998).
241 See id.
242 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do CEO’s Set Their Own
Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do (working paper, 2000).
243 See id.
244 See Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents With and
Without Principals, 90 AMER. ECON. ASSOC. 203 (2000).
245 See id.
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accepted the presence of rent extraction as a phenomenon applying only to
situations in which managers are relatively more powerful rather than
applying more generally.
In our view, once the connection between power and rent is
recognized, there is reason to believe that rent extraction might take place to
some extent in all companies without a controlling or dominant shareholder.
To be sure, managers can be expected to have relatively less power, and thus
to be able to extract less rent, in circumstances in which a large external
shareholder is present or more shares are in the hands of institutions. Even
in such circumstances, however, managers still have considerable power, as
we have explained, and can thus be expected to extract rent.246 Indeed, the
evidence that we have described in the preceding sections of Part IV, which
applies also to institution- or large shareholder-influenced companies,
indicates that rent extraction might well take place, even if to a reduced
extent, in such companies.
G. Differences between U.S. and Non-U.S. Companies
U.S. CEO’s are paid considerably more than their non-U.S.
counterparts,247 but lower-level U.S. executives do not receive premium
pay.248 U.S. CEO’s receive both more total compensation and more option or
equity-based pay.249 Even ignoring incentive pay, however, U.S. CEO’s
receive greater compensation than their non-U.S. counterparts.250 U.S.
human resources directors, by comparison, receive no more compensation
and no more long-term incentive compensation than their international

Consider cases in which a five- or ten-percent external shareholder is
present. Given the power that managers have to issue poison pills and to control the
proxy machinery, such a shareholder might have influence but usually not anything
that is close to controlling power. Thus, executives in such cases are likely to have
still a great deal of power.
247 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 70-72 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995); Murphy, supra note 3.
248 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 72-73 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995).
249 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 70-72 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995); Murphy, supra note 3.
250 See Mark J. Lowenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000).
246
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counterparts.251 The U.S./international CEO pay gap provides yet another
puzzle for students of executive compensation to explain.252
Can the optimal contracting view provide a persuasive explanation
for this pattern? First, it might be argued that U.S. CEO's are simply more
important or more scarce. The skills of the CEO would be more important in
the U.S. if our corporate culture is more focused on the top than others.
Undoubtedly the CEO is the major factor in the success of many U.S.
companies, but surely CEO’s are very important in many foreign countries.
Moreover, although U.S. firms employ a particularly large number of CEO’s,
they employ an even larger number of junior executives. It is unclear why
qualified CEO’s would be relatively more scarce.253
CEO’s also could be argued to be more important in the U.S. because
the competitive markets in the U.S. are more “demanding,” and this makes a
CEO’s skills more important for the company’s performance. In economies
with much government regulation and intervention, however, a company’s
performance might also depend critically on the skills of the CEO (but in this
case on different skills) in dealing with political and regulatory constraints.
Second, it might be that the tournament model of executive
compensation is more applicable in the U.S. than it is in other countries.
According to this theory of compensation, junior executives accept lower pay
in their present jobs in exchange for the chance of winning the tournament,
becoming CEO, and capturing the big prize.254 It is possible that this
extremely competitive, survival-of-the-fittest model simply works better in
See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 72-73 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995).
252 See Murphy, supra note 3 for a thorough review of the puzzle posed by
cross-country differences in CEO compensation.
253 Rosen argues that in market equilibrium the most talented executives will
hold the top positions in the largest companies where their marginal productivity
will be most greatly magnified, and that scarcity rents will pertain. See Sherwin
Rosen, Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings, 13 BELL. J. ECON. 311
(1982); Sherwin Rosen, Contracts and the Market for Executives in 1 THE ECONOMICS OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 182 (Kevin J. Hallock and Kevin J. Murphy, eds.) (1992).
This ability-matching theory of compensation finds further support in evidence that
CEO’s of firms operating multiple lines of business are paid more than CEO’s of
similarly sized nondiversified firms. See Nancy Rose and Andrea Shepard, Firm
Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?
28 RAND J. ECON. 489 (1994) (arguing that the weight of the evidence is more
consistent with an ability matching theory than with entrenchment). It is not clear,
however, why U.S. businesses would be more susceptible to scarcity rents than nonU.S. firms.
254 See Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as
Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981).
251
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our highly laissez faire corporate culture than it does abroad. There are
theoretical problems with the tournament theory,255 however, and no real
evidence that it applies to executive pay.
Third, it might be argued that U.S. firms are at the front of the
learning curve when it comes to CEO pay. It has been suggested that other
countries have not caught up to the U.S. with regard to stock-based
compensation.256 However, the typical CEO in over half of the foreign
countries surveyed by Towers Perrin in 1997 received options or other longterm performance units; they simply received less.257 Moreover, the learning
curve hypothesis fails to explain why junior executives in the U.S are paid
comparably with their non-U.S. peers, but U.S. CEO’s are not.
While the pattern of cross-country differences is difficult to explain
from the optimal contracting view, the rent extraction view can provide a
persuasive account of it. As we have discussed, rent extraction depends on
the power held by the managers. In the U.S., managers have considerable
power, especially, as we have seen, when there is no large shareholder to
provide discipline. The managers use this power to extract rent through
enhanced executive compensation. For most U.S. CEO’s, compensation is
the only mechanism for extracting rent. Insider trading opportunities are
limited, and professional U.S. CEO’s rarely have other business interests that
can be used to extract rent through favorable contractual arrangements.
Executive compensation generally will be the only significant means of
extracting monetary rent.
In other countries, the incidence of companies with dispersed
ownership is much smaller, and companies with controlling shareholders are
much more prevalent.258 In companies with controlling shareholders, there
are two possibilities. If the CEO is not part of the controlling group or
family, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to prevent excessive
compensation. Alternatively, the CEO is a member of the controlling group
or family. Typically, the controlling group or family will control other
significant assets. In such a case, there often will be more important avenues
Unlike contracts, tournaments may provide poor incentives when it is
apparent that one player is likely to win and others likely to lose the competition
(due to differences in skills or other qualities). Tournament compensation
structures may be unstable if some firms pay by contract. Tournaments may
encourage collusion or sabotage. Finally, when outputs are multidimensional,
determining the winner of the tournament may be difficult. See Ronald A. Dye, The
Trouble with Tournaments, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 147 (1984).
256 See John M. Abowd and Michael L. Bognanno, International Differences in
Executive and Managerial Compensation, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE
STRUCTURES 67 (R. Freeman and L. Katz, eds., 1995).
257 See Murphy, supra note 3.
258 See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 417 (1999).
255
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of extracting rent – through self-dealing and the taking of business
opportunities.259 In this case, limiting executive compensation might be an
effective means of camouflaging the overall rent that is being extracted.
Limiting compensation would create the impression that the controlling
shareholder is being loyal to minority shareholders, and compensation is not
the big source of rent in this situation anyway.
In sum, in other countries the CEO either has less power to extract
rent (if the CEO is not part of the controlling family/entity) or the CEO
generally has other avenues to extract rent (if the CEO is affiliated with the
controller). In contrast, in U.S. companies with dispersed shareholders,
executives have significant power, which they use to extract rent through the
only means available to them – maximizing their own compensation.
The rent extraction explanation is consistent with the observation that
the cross-country difference in pay is concentrated at the top, while lower
level U.S. executives do not receive excessive pay. We have argued that at
times power will be concentrated in the hands of the CEO, and at times in
the hands of the top management team. This would suggest that at times the
pay differential will be observed only at the level of the CEO, and at times
the differential would be enjoyed by other top executives. Thus, it is not
surprising that human resource directors and other lower-level executives
who do not have a significant share of corporate power would not enjoy
greater compensation in comparison with their non-U.S. peers.260
The rent extraction analysis that we have put forward here also is
consistent with our explanation of the differences in compensation practices
observed between U.S. companies that do and do not have large
shareholders. Whether or not they control the firm, large shareholders have
an incentive and some ability to constrain managerial rent extraction through
excessive executive compensation.

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined two alternative views of executive
compensation: an optimal contracting view, which thus far has dominated
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow
Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (R. Morck, ed.) (2000). It would
be an interesting study to compare the compensation of executives who are and
who are not members of controlling stockholder families and test the prediction that
the latter would receive less compensation.
260 Another interesting study would compare international pay difference
between CEO's, COO's, CFO's, and other very senior executives who might
realistically share power with a CEO.
259
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academic research on the subject, and an alternative rent extraction view.
Whereas the former view regards executive compensation as an instrument
for combating the agency problem between managers and dispersed
shareholders, the latter view regards such compensation as a product of the
agency problem.
Analyzing the processes that set executive compensation, we have
identified reasons to believe that their outcomes might deviate significantly
from the optimal contracting model. Whatever the appearances, executive
compensation generally is not the product of arms’ length bargaining, but is
the result of a process that executives can substantially influence. Moreover,
although executive compensation is set against a background of market
forces, these forces are hardly strong and precise enough to compel optimal
contracting outcomes for compensation arrangements.
As a result,
executives can use their power to extract rents. The extraction of rent occurs
against a background of certain constraints, and this provides incentives for
structuring compensation arrangements in a way that camouflages the
presence and extent of rent extraction.
Analyzing the large body of empirical evidence on executive
compensation, we have concluded that the evidence supports the view that
rent extraction plays a significant role in the process. Some broad features of
the executive compensation landscape are consistent with both views. A
number of significant features and patterns of executive compensation,
however, can be better explained by rent extraction. Indeed, various puzzles
that have long occupied researchers operating under the optimal contracting
view can be well explained by the rent extraction model.
The role that rent extraction plays in executive compensation has
implications for the study, practice, and regulation of corporate governance.
For these implications to receive the attention they deserve, the role of rent
extraction needs to be recognized and appreciated. We hope that this paper
will contribute to such recognition and that it will provide a useful
framework for subsequent study of the problem of rent extraction in
executive compensation.
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